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INTRODUCTION
“Given the bloated dockets that district courts have now come to
expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today’s federal
judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”1
Almost twenty-five years have passed since Justice Stevens wrote these
words. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently reaffirmed the importance of the

1

Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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United States magistrate judges in her majority opinion in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,2 where she wrote:
Congress has also authorized the appointment of bankruptcy and magistrate
judges, who do not enjoy the protections of Article III, to assist Article III courts
in their work. The number of magistrate and bankruptcy judgeships exceeds the
number of circuit and district judgeships. And it is no exaggeration to say that
without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work of the
federal court system would grind nearly to a halt. 3

Indeed, the organization of this conference, Magistrate Judges and the
Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, with numerous distinguished contributors, further highlights the significant role that United States magistrate judges
play in the operation of the federal district courts.
This conference provides us with an opportunity to share our perspectives
on how the authority and utilization of magistrate judges have expanded over
the past quarter century. By happy coincidence, this conference occurs twentyfive years after several events that profoundly shaped how magistrate judges
exercise their authority and are utilized throughout the district courts. As senior
attorneys for the Judicial Services Office in the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (Administrative Office), we have had a unique opportunity to observe the evolution of magistrate judge authority and utilization in the federal
district courts that arose directly from those events.4
Part I of the paper will discuss several twenty-fifth anniversaries that occurred in 2015 and 2016 that proved to have a major impact on the expansion
of magistrate judge authority and utilization. Part II will examine in depth numerous Supreme Court and circuit court cases that reflect how magistrate judge
authority expanded over the past twenty-five years. Part III will discuss how
magistrate judge utilization has expanded in the same period.
I.

25TH ANNIVERSARIES

In 1990 and 1991, several events occurred that had a significant impact on
the federal magistrate judges system and led to the expansion of the magistrate
judge authority and utilization throughout the United States district courts. The
final report of the Federal Court Study Committee in 1990, the enactment of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, and the issuance of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Peretz v. United States5 in 1991 are discussed below.

2

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
Id. at 1938–39 (footnote omitted).
4 The authors would like to thank James Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S
Courts, Laura Minor, Associate Director, Department of Program Services, and Michele
Reed, Chief, Judicial Services Office, for graciously giving us the opportunity to participate
in this conference and to write this paper.
5 Peretz, 501 U.S. 923.
3
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A. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) in 1988 as
an entity within the Judicial Conference of the United States.6 Congress instructed the Committee to “recommend revisions to be made to laws of the
United States as the Committee, on the basis of such study, deems advisable.”7
Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the FCSC’s fifteen members.8 Twenty-five
years ago, on April 2, 1990, the FCSC issued its final report.9 This is the first
anniversary we will discuss.
Although the FCSC’s final report made several recommendations concerning the federal magistrates system,10 two recommendations had particular significance for the development of magistrate judge authority and utilization in
the years to come. First, the FCSC recommended that “Congress should amend
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) to allow district judges . . . to remind parties of the possibilities of consent to civil trials before magistrates.”11 Noting that the existing
language of § 636(c) specifically prohibited district judges and magistrates
from discussing consent with parties after they received the initial consent notice,12 the FCSC recommended allowing district judges and magistrates to further advise parties and counsel of the right to consent later in the case, while
mandating that parties be told there would be no adverse consequences if they
refused to consent.13 This proposed amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act,
6

Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988).
Id. § 105, 102 Stat. at 4645.
8 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31
(Apr. 2, 1990). The Committee was chaired by Circuit Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit; other notable members of the FCSC included Senators Charles
E. Grassley from Iowa and Howell Heflin from Alabama, Representatives Robert W.
Kastenmeier from Wisconsin and Carlos J. Moorhead from California, Circuit Judge Levin
H. Campbell, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, District Judge (now Circuit Judge) José A. Cabranes,
District of Connecticut, and District Judge Judith N. Keep, Southern District of California.
Id. at 193–96.
9 See id.
10 The full history of the proposals submitted to the FCSC by the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrates System (Magistrates Committee) and the complete list of the
FCSC’s final recommendations concerning the magistrates system are set forth in
MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A GUIDE TO THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 79–87 (2009) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
11 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79.
12 The relevant language in § 636(c) stated,
7

the clerk of the court shall, at the time [an] action is filed, notify the parties of their right to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. . . . Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to
a magistrate.

Id. at 79–80.
13 Id. at 80. The specific statutory language suggested by the FCSC stated, “Thereafter either
the district judge or the magistrate may again advise the parties of that right but, in so doing,
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enacted in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, relaxed the civil consent
provision and cleared the way for innovative methods that would be utilized by
district courts to encourage litigant consent to disposition of civil cases by magistrate judges.14
The second significant recommendation of the FCSC was to request that
the Judicial Conference “authorize a study of the constitutional limits of United
States magistrates’ possible jurisdiction and catalog their duties.”15 In particular, the FCSC stated that “[s]ome district courts have been reluctant to expand
the role of magistrates because of confusion over magistrates’ constitutional
and statutory authority.”16 Noting with concern that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,17
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,18 and Gomez v. United States19 had raised
“serious questions about what matters non-Article III judicial officers may handle,” the FCSC further stated:
District judges should have available an analysis of the legislative history of
the Magistrates Act and a list of those duties which bear “some relation to the
specified duties,” as Gomez dictates. . . . This study should include all cases and
statutes (in addition to 28 U.S.C. § 636) that discuss duties magistrates may perform, so that the district court will have a full compilation of the magistrates’
statutory jurisdiction, with a description of the presumption of validity and
standard of review by the district court.20

After receiving the FCSC’s recommendations, the Judicial Conference authorized the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System
(Magistrate Committee) to conduct a study of the magistrate judges system and
compile a catalog of magistrate duties.21 The Magistrate Committee distributed

shall also advise the parties that they are free to withhold consent without fear of adverse
substantive consequences.” Id.
14 Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 308, 104 Stat. 5104, 5112 (1990); see also infra Section I.B.1.b.ii.
15 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 80.
16 Id.
17 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
18 See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
19 See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
20 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 80.
21 MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY 1 (1993) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS]; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 86, 91; Philip M. Pro & Thomas C.
Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1522–23 (1995); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: ACTIVITIES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 66–67 (1991).
The Magistrate Judges Committee appointed a special subcommittee, composed of District
Judge William T. Hart [Northern District of Illinois] (Chairman), District Judge Barbara J. Rothstein [Western District of Washington] and District Judge Frederic N. Smalkin [District of
Maryland], to supervise the project. The study [was] prepared by the staff of the Magistrates
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the first part of its study, the Inventory of United States Magistrate Judge Duties (the Inventory), in December 1991, with updated editions issued in 1995,
1999, and 2013.22 The Inventory provides district courts with a quick guide to,
and catalog of, the types of duties that magistrate judges may perform under
statutory and case law as suggested by the FCSC. In June 1993, the Magistrate
Committee published the second part of its study, A Constitutional Analysis of
Magistrate Judge Authority (Constitutional Analysis), which “analyzes various
Supreme Court and circuit court opinions examining the constitutional limits of
magistrate judge authority [and] reviews pertinent Supreme Court opinions discussing the authority of other non-Article III judicial officers, including bankruptcy judges.”23 The third part of the study, A Guide to the Legislative History
of the Federal Magistrate Judges System (Legislative History”), constituted the
legislative analysis recommended by the FCSC of the Federal Magistrates Act
and other statutes, and was originally published in February 1995. An updated
edition of the Legislative History was issued in September 2009.24
In preparing these publications, the staff at the Administrative Office,
which supports the Magistrate Judges Committee,25 monitored, collected, and
summarized court decisions that involved magistrate judge authority. The staff
of the Administrative Office, which includes the authors of this paper, continue
to do so up to the present. In the process, they observed the changes and expansions of magistrate judge authority that have occurred over the past twenty-five
years and were often asked to advise the Magistrate Judges Committee on these
changes. Similarly, Administrative Office staff have also monitored the various
ways district judges have utilized magistrate judges over the past quarter century and are often asked to describe and analyze such utilization techniques for
the Committee and for federal judges seeking information on different ways to
utilize magistrate judges. Expansion of magistrate judges’ authority and utilization were further facilitated, often in unanticipated ways, by Congress when it
passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.26

Judges Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts under the subcommittee’s supervision.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 1–2.
22 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, INVENTORY OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE DUTIES (4th ed. 2013).
23 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 92; see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note
21.
24 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 92.
25 The name was changed to the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges
System from the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrates System after the official title of the office was changed to United States magistrate judge in a provision of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See infra Section I.B.1.a. For a more detailed explanation of the role of the Magistrate Judges Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Administrative Office in the administration of the federal magistrate judges system, see Pro &
Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1507–10.
26 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
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B. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
On December 1, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990. Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act was the
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA). “Title III contained the Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act. Other titles created new Article III judgeships
and revised judicial discipline and removal procedures. The Judicial Improvements Act amended the Federal Magistrates Act, and had far-reaching effects
on the Judiciary as a whole.”27
1. Civil Justice Reform Act
On January 25, 1990, Senators Joseph Biden and Strom Thurmond initially
introduced the CJRA as S. 2027.28 “The stated purpose of the S. 2027 was to
improve access to the courts by reducing costs and delays in civil litigation.”29
The proposed legislation was based upon recommendations set forth in a report
issued by the Brookings Institution in 1989.30
a. CJRA and Magistrate Judges
In its original form, “S. 2027 would have required that ‘a mandatory discovery-case management conference, presided over by a judge and not a magistrate, be held in all cases,’ ” and in other ways would have explicitly limited the
role of magistrate judges in the civil pretrial process.31 “In testimony before the
[Senate] Judiciary Committee, several witnesses, including the Judicial Conference’s representative, favored reinstatement of a pretrial role for magistrate
judges.”32
On May 17, 1990, after several discussions between members of Congress
and members of the Judicial Conference (including an April 1990 meeting between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Senator Biden) concerning Judicial Conference objections to the legislation, the bill was revised and resubmitted as S.
2648.33 In his statement introducing the bill, Senator Biden observed that S.
2648 contained numerous changes from the original proposed legislation.34 In
27

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 87.
Id.
29 Id. at 87–88.
30 Id. at 88 n.288; see BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN
CIVIL LITIGATION 12–33 (1989).
31 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823).
32 Id.; see Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 208, 212
(1990) (statement of Aubrey E. Robinson, C.J., United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Washington, DC).
33 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88.
34 Id.
28
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particular, the revised legislation permitted magistrate judges to be involved in
civil pretrial practice in response to concerns conveyed by the Conference and
by witnesses who testified during the Judiciary Committee’s first hearing on
the bill.35
The Committee’s report on the bill gave several reasons for authorizing
magistrate judges to take part in the preliminary phases of civil cases. First, the
Committee expressed concern that fewer cases might settle if district judges
were required to conduct all pretrial conferences because parties would be reticent to reveal all aspects of their case to the judge who would finally resolve
the matter at trial.36 Second, allowing magistrate judges to handle civil case
management duties would provide district judges with more time to conduct
other adjudicatory matters.37 Finally, noting that district courts faced growing
civil and criminal caseloads, and that magistrate judges had increasingly impressive credentials as judges, the Committee set forth its view that magistrate
judges should be given significant authority to conduct pretrial and case management duties in civil cases.38 Interestingly, the Judiciary Committee, observing that the revised legislation would provide for the exercise of the “full role
of magistrates in the pretrial process,” noted that “valid questions had been
raised about the full extent of magistrates’ constitutional authority,” and it
“therefore endorsed the recommendation of the [FCSC] that the Judicial Conference conduct an in depth study of magistrate judge authority.”39
The enactment of the CJRA in December 1990 acknowledged the important role of magistrate judges in the pretrial management of civil cases in the
federal courts. This explicit acceptance of the use of magistrate judges in pretrial phases of federal civil litigation contributed directly to the expansion of
magistrate judge authority in civil cases throughout the nation in the years following the CJRA’s enactment.
b. Federal Court Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990
The Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act appears in Title
III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.40 “The [FCSCI] Act’s statement
of purpose described the legislation as proposing ‘noncontroversial’ recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee.41 The Federal Courts
35

See 136 CONG. REC. S6473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). For a more detailed discussion of
the Judicial Conference’s objections to the Civil Justice Reform Act and its response to the
proposed legislation, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88–89.
36 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 89 & n.292.
39 Id. at 89 n.292 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823 n.10).
40 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89; see Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104 (1990).
41 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89.
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Study Committee Implementation Act contained [two] significant amendments
to the Federal Magistrates Act.”42
i.

Change of Title to “Magistrate Judge”

Under section 321, the FCSCI Act changed the title from United States
magistrate to “United States magistrate judge.”43 The section stated:
After the enactment of this Act, each United States magistrate appointed
under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United
States magistrate judge, and any reference to any United States magistrate or
magistrate that is contained in title 28, United States Code, in any other Federal
statute, or in any regulation of any department or agency of the United States in
the executive branch that was issued before the enactment of this Act, shall be
deemed to refer to a United States magistrate judge appointed under section 631
of title 28, United States Code.44

The title change applied equally to both full-time and part-time magistrate
judges.45
“The committee report noted that the title “judge” is commonly assigned to
non-Article III adjudicators in the federal court system, and that the new title of
magistrate judge is consistent with that of other judicial officers such as bankruptcy judges, tax court judges and claims court judges.”46 It further stated that
“[t]he provision is one of nomenclature only and is designed to reflect more accurately the responsibilities and duties of the office,” and “[i]t is not intended to
affect the substantive authority or jurisdiction of full-time or part-time magistrates.”47 In June 1991, “the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference
changed the name of the Magistrates Committee to ‘Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System.’ ”48
ii.

Relaxation of Judicial Notification of Consent to Trial By
Magistrate Judges in Civil Actions

Under section 308(a), the FCSCI Act “amended 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) to
permit [district] judges and magistrate judges to advise civil litigants of the op-

42

Id. See id. at 89–91 for the procedural history of Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act.
43 H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860.
44 Id.
45 Interestingly, the title change was described in the statute’s legislative history as a “noncontroversial” recommendation of FCSC, although the FCSC did not recommend a change
in the title and the Judicial Conference did not request that the title of United States magistrate be changed prior to the statute’s enactment. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10,
at 85, 89–90.
46 Id. at 90.
47 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 31).
48 See id.
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tion to consent to trial by a magistrate judge.”49 In the committee report accompanying this provision, Congress expressed concern that its intent in enacting
§ 636(c) in 1979 was being impeded by the existing language:
Under present provisions, judicial officers may not attempt to persuade or
induce any party to consent to reference of a civil matter to a magistrate. Many
judges refrain entirely from mentioning to parties the option to consent to civil
trial by a magistrate. Litigants in many jurisdictions often receive little more
than a standardized written notification of this option with the pleadings in a civil case. As a result, most parties in civil cases do not consent to magistrate jurisdiction. The present procedures have effectively frustrated the intent of the 1979
amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act which authorized magistrates to try
civil consent cases.50

If the intent of this legislation was to further encourage the use of magistrate judges to dispose of civil cases with the consent of the parties, the effect
was also to free district judges to experiment with new and novel ways of expanding the utilization of magistrate judges in civil consent cases.
c.

Authorization of Additional District Judgeships

Title II of the Act, known as the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, authorized
additional Article III judgeships for the district courts and the courts of appeals.51 Specifically, the provisions authorized sixty-one additional district
court judgeships and eleven circuit court judgeships.52 In addition, the legislation converted eight temporary district judgeships into permanent status and
converted four judgeships that were split between different districts into four
permanent judgeships.53
The significance of this legislation only became apparent after many years
had passed. To date, this has been the last omnibus judgeship bill where Congress authorized a significant number of Article III judgeships. In the subsequent twenty-five years, Congress authorized only twenty-seven additional
permanent district judgeships: nine in 1999, ten in 2000, and eight in 2002.54 In
short, the number of Article III judges has remained largely stable over the past
quarter century.
To deal with the demands of caseloads that continued to grow after 1990,
district courts increasingly looked to the Judicial Conference to authorize addi49

Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 27.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 27.
51 S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 65–66 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6854–55.
52 See Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/auth
orized-judgeships [https://perma.cc/P5AQ-ZXHL] (last visited Apr. 19 2015) (charting the
total numbers of judgeships authorized for each district and appeals court in 1990).
53 Id.
54 See id.; see also Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-37; Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553 app. B, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-84 to
85; 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107273, § 312, 116 Stat. 1758, 1786 (2002).
50
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tional full-time magistrate judge positions. Between fiscal years 1990 and 2016,
the Judicial Conference authorized 234 new full-time magistrate judge positions, while converting or eliminating 117 part-time magistrate judge positions
and 5 clerk/magistrate judge positions.55 The contrast with the Article III judi55

See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
26–31 (Mar. 1989) (authorizing seven full-time magistrate judge positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 73–79 (Sept. 1989) (authorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 28–37 (Mar. 1990) (authorizing ten full-time positions); REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES at 95–101 (Sept.
1990) [hereinafter JCUS-SEP 1990] (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 21–31 (Mar. 1991) (authorizing sixteen full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 67–71 (Sept. 1991) (authorizing nine full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
31–34 (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter JCUS-MAR 1992] (authorizing fifteen full-time positions);
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 75–79
(Sept. 1992) (authorizing five full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 19–22 (Mar. 1993) (authorizing seven fulltime positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 52–56 (Sept. 1993) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23–27 (Mar. 1994) (authorizing eleven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 61–65 (Sept. 1994) (authorizing ten full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
24–28 (Mar. 1995) (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 91–95 (Sept. 1995) (authorizing three
full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 30–33 (Mar. 1996) (authorizing one full-time position); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 65–68 (Sept. 1996) (authorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 29–33 (Mar. 1997) (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 78–81 (Sept.
1997) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25–28 (Mar. 1998) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
82–85 (Sept. 1998) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 29–32 (Mar. 1999) (authorizing seven
full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 70–73 (Sept. 1999) (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23–26 (Mar. 2000) (authorizing two full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 61–64 (Sept. 2000) (authorizing ten full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
28–30 (Mar. 2001) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 65–67 (Sept./Oct. 2001) (authorizing one
full-time position); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 26–28 (Mar. 2002) (authorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 54–57 (Sept. 2002) (authorizing nine full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (Mar. 2003) (authorizing one full-time position);
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 32–34
(Sept. 2003) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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ciary is startling. The number of full-time magistrate judges has increased by
62 percent in the past twenty-five years.56 In the same time period, as noted
above, the growth in the number of Article III judgeships has been negligible.
At the same time, the role of part-time magistrate judges in the federal
courts has declined, with a significant decrease in the number of these positions. In fiscal year 1990, there were 159 part-time magistrate judge positions,
while in fiscal year 2014 only 36 part-time positions remained, a decline of 78
percent.57 Much of this decline can be attributed to the long-standing preference
of Congress and the Judicial Conference for establishing a system of full-time
magistrate judges where feasible.58 Indeed, the Magistrates Committee made
the following recommendation at its June 1990 meeting for the Judicial Conference’s consideration in September 1990:
Your Committee concluded that it must move faster in achieving a system composed primarily of full-time magistrates. Consequently, your Committee concluded that all part-time magistrate positions should be examined in the near future, with a view towards expediting the process of eliminating, consolidating,
or converting the positions. Some part-time magistrate positions will undoubtedly need to be retained at locations where the volume of district court business
clearly does not warrant the authorization of a full-time magistrate position, but
where other legitimate considerations exist. In this respect, your Committee is of
the opinion that geographical considerations and the cost-savings generally asJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23–26 (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter JCUS-MAR
2004] (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27–31 (Sept. 2004) (authorizing five full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
33–36 (Sept. 2005) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 30–31 (Sept. 2006) (authorizing two fulltime positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 30–32 (Sept. 2007) (authorizing two full-time positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 30–33 (Sept. 2008) (authorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Mar. 2009) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 26–30 (Sept. 2009) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 26–27 (Sept. 2010) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
32–33 (Sept. 2011) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25–26 (Sept. 2014) (authorizing three fulltime positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 27–28 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter JCUS-SEP 2015] (authorizing two full-time positions).
56 At the beginning of fiscal year 1990, there were 329 full-time magistrate judge positions
authorized by the Judicial Conference, while in fiscal year 2014, there were 534 full-time
magistrate judge positions authorized. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.1.1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicialfacts-and-figures-2014 [https://perma.cc/FP4Y-ZMGS].
57 See id.; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS 43 tbl.30 (1990).
58 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 9–10, 24, 46, 51, 73, 77–78.
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sociated with part-time magistrate positions are not sufficient in and of themselves to justify retention of individual part-time magistrate positions.59

In response, the Conference reaffirmed its view that the federal magistrates
system should as much as possible consist of full-time judicial officers, and
therefore endorsed the Committee’s plan “to review each part-time magistrate
position on an individual basis with a view towards eliminating as many parttime positions as feasible, either by abolishing them, combining them, or converting them to full-time status.”60 This is exactly what happened in the following twenty-five years, with a large number of these part-time positions being
converted into full-time magistrate judge positions.61
C. Peretz v. United States
The third significant anniversary occurred in 2016. June 27, 2016, was the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Peretz v. United
States,62 a case that has had an enormous impact on how magistrate judges are
used in the district courts. Indeed, much of the expansion of magistrate judge
duties in the past twenty-five years has resulted from the Court’s interpretation
of § 636(b)(3) and its view that magistrate judges may handle many critical duties in felony and other cases, with the defendant’s consent and with the availability of de novo review by an Article III judge.
As in the Court’s earlier decision in Gomez v. United States,63 Peretz concerned whether a magistrate judge could preside over voir dire in a felony
case.64 Unlike the petitioner in Gomez, however, petitioner Rafael Peretz specifically consented to having a magistrate judge select the jury in his case.65 For
the majority in Peretz, the defendant’s consent to the magistrate judge’s authority was the critical factor that allowed the referral of voir dire to a magistrate
judge without violating Article III of the Constitution.66

59

Id. at 77.
Id. at 78; accord JCUS-SEP 1990, supra note 55, at 93.
61 For example, at its June 2015 meeting the Magistrate Judges Committee voted to recommend “the conversion of the part-time magistrate judge position at Wichita Falls in the
Northern District of Texas to a full-time magistrate judge position designated as Wichita
Falls or Fort Worth.” JCUS-SEP 2015, supra note 55. The recommendation was subsequently adopted by the Judicial Conference at its September 2015 session and the last part-time
magistrate judge position in the Fifth Circuit will be discontinued with the appointment of
the newly-authorized full-time magistrate judge position. Id.
62 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
63 Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874–76 (1989) (holding that § 636(b)(3) did not
authorize a magistrate judge to conduct voir dire in a felony case as an additional duty if the
defendant objected to the magistrate judge’s involvement); see also CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 12–14.
64 Peretz, 501 U.S. at 925.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 936.
60
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Peretz was charged with importing heroin in the Eastern District of New
York.67 At a pretrial conference attended by Peretz and his attorney, the district
judge asked Peretz’s attorney if he had any objection to a magistrate judge selecting the jury for the trial.68 Counsel responded, “I would love the opportunity.”69 Before beginning jury selection, the magistrate judge also received assurances from counsel that there was no objection to her involvement.70 The
magistrate judge selected the jury, and the district judge was not asked to review any ruling made by the magistrate judge during voir dire.71
The case proceeded to trial and Peretz was convicted.72 Only on appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (and after the Supreme Court had
released its opinion in Gomez) did the defendant raise an objection to the magistrate judge’s involvement in voir dire.73 The court of appeals rejected the petitioner’s argument and upheld the conviction.74 Recognizing a split in the circuit
courts’ interpretations of its Gomez decision,75 the Supreme Court granted
Peretz’s petition for certiorari.76
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, began his analysis by declaring,
“Our holding in Gomez was narrow.”77 Justice Stevens emphasized that the
question before the Court in Gomez was limited to whether a magistrate judge
could conduct felony voir dire over a defendant’s objection.78 Even while the
Court had held in Gomez that felony voir dire without the defendant’s consent
was not an “additional duty” that could be delegated to magistrate judges under
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), it also recognized that magistrate judges “play an integral and important role in the federal judicial system.”79
The petitioner’s consent changed everything in Peretz. Unlike Gomez,
where the Court deduced “an alternative interpretation of the additional duties
clause” from the context of the statutory scheme to avoid constitutional ques67

Id. at 925.
Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 494 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 955
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1990); Virgin Islands v.
Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542 (1st Cir.
1989); United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375, 382–83 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
France, 886 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537,
1544 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1430–31 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
76 Peretz, 501 U.S. at 927.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 927–28 (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869 (1989)).
68
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tions,80 petitioner’s consent in Peretz removed many of the perceived constitutional difficulties. Justice Stevens declared, “The absence of any constitutional
difficulty removes one concern that motivated us in Gomez to require unambiguous evidence of Congress’ intent to include jury selection among a magistrate’s additional duties.”81 Consent thus provided the Court with greater latitude to construe the “additional duties” clause and Congress’ intent.
Under the majority’s reasoning, the reduction of constitutional concerns allowed the Court to focus on the Federal Magistrate Act’s more general purpose
of aiding the judiciary. The Act’s purpose thus became paramount to the Court:
The generality of the category of “additional duties” indicates that Congress intended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process that had not already been
tried or even foreseen. If Congress had intended strictly to limit these additional
duties to functions considered in the committee hearings or debates, presumably
it would have included in the statute a bill of particulars rather than a broad residuary clause. Construing this residuary clause absent concerns about raising a
constitutional issue or depriving a defendant of an important right, we should not
foreclose constructive experiments that are acceptable to all participants in the
trial process and are consistent with the basic purposes of the statute. 82

Although the Court acknowledged the importance of voir dire as a critical
phase of a felony trial, the Court again viewed consent as the key factor.83 The
Court revisited its statutory analysis in Gomez to determine whether there was a
connection between consensual felony voir dire and other duties referred to
magistrate judges under the Act.84
The Court noted that “[b]ecause the specified duties that Congress authorized magistrates to perform without the consent of the parties were not comparable in importance to supervision of felony trial voir dire . . . , we did not waver from our conclusion that a magistrate cannot conduct voir dire over the
defendant’s objection.”85 Justice Stevens concluded, “However, with the parties’ consent, a district judge may delegate to a magistrate supervision of entire
civil and misdemeanor trials. These duties are comparable in responsibility and
importance to presiding over voir dire at a felony trial.”86 Accordingly, felony
voir dire with the defendant’s consent was a permissible additional duty under
§ 636(b)(3).87
Consent was also crucial to the Court’s constitutional analysis. Justice Stevens began by stating flatly that “[t]here is no constitutional infirmity in the
delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants con80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864.
Peretz, 501 U.S. at 932.
Id. at 932–33.
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933.
Id.
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sent.”88 This position was based on a two-step Article III analysis. First, the
majority observed that the Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,89 United States v. Gagnon,90 and other decisions had held that a litigant
may waive his or her right to an Article III judge, as well as other fundamental
rights in both civil and criminal cases.91 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
with his consent the defendant in Peretz had waived any personal constitutional
right to a district judge at voir dire.92
Second, even if the “structural” protections of Article III, which guarantee
the separation of powers between the three branches of the government, could
not be waived by an individual litigant, the Court concluded that the district
court’s procedures in supervising magistrate judges allayed any fears that Article III had been violated.93 A district court’s overall control of its magistrate
judges through its powers of appointment and removal, the referral of duties,
and its ultimate power to review the magistrate judge’s actions in conducting
the voir dire satisfied any separation of powers concerns regarding the independence of the Judiciary from the other branches.94
To reach its conclusion, the majority adopted Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in United States v. Raddatz, where he concluded that the district
court’s supervisory authority over magistrate judges satisfied lingering constitutional questions:
Under these circumstances, I simply do not perceive the threat to the judicial
power or the independence of judicial decisionmaking that underlies Art. III. . . .
[W]e confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in Art. III judges
the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial
assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control
over the assistants’ activities.95

The majority finally addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of review applicable to § 636(b)(3) that had troubled the Court in Gomez. While acknowledging that the statutory provision contained no express standard of review to be applied by the supervising court, the Court again cited Raddatz for
the proposition that any standard of review under § 636(b) is only invoked
when a party objects to the magistrate judge’s decision.96 Because Peretz did
not object to the magistrate judge’s handling of voir dire at trial, the issue of the
applicable standard of review did not arise in the case at bar.97 The Court noted,
88

Id. at 936.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
90 470 U.S. 522 (1985).
91 Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936.
92 Id. at 937.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Peretz, 501 U.S. at 938–39 (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685–86
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
96 Id. at 939.
97 Id.
89
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however, that if review was requested, “nothing in the statute precludes a district court from providing the review that the Constitution requires.”98 By implication, the Court suggested that de novo determination might be applicable.
The majority’s opinion in Peretz,99 with its emphasis on litigant consent
and its reaffirmation of Congress’ purpose in enacting the Federal Magistrates
Act to allow for constructive experimentation in referring duties to magistrate
judges, would prove to have a significant impact on magistrate judge authority
and utilization in succeeding years. As we shall explore in greater detail, district courts have repeatedly applied the reasoning in Peretz as a basis for expanding magistrate judge utilization in a variety of innovative ways.
D. Three Anniversaries
Taken together, the FCSC’s final report in April 1990, the enactment of the
Judicial Improvements Act in December 1990, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Peretz in June 1991 set the stage for the significant expansion of magistrate judge authority and utilization that occurred in the following years. For the
first time, pursuant to the FCSC’s recommendation, district judges and magistrate judges were provided with reference materials, particularly the Inventory,
which provided a catalog of duties that could be referred to magistrate judges.100 As we shall discuss in greater depth, the CJRA specifically encouraged
district courts to use magistrate judges in pretrial case management.101 In addition, the FCSC implementation provisions enacted in 1990 changed the official
title of the office to “magistrate judge” and made it easier for district judges and
magistrate judges to discuss with litigants the option of consenting to have a
magistrate judge dispose of civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).102 A year later, the Supreme Court in Peretz permitted magistrate judges to conduct critical
duties in felony cases with the parties’ consent, and reaffirmed a basic purpose
of the Federal Magistrates Act to encourage district courts to experiment with
innovative ways with using magistrate judges.103
Finally, although not recognized until years later, Congress’s reluctance to
authorize significant numbers of Article III judgeships in the years following
the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 led district courts to seek the authorization
of large numbers of additional magistrate judge positions to deal with growing
caseloads.104 The result was profound growth in the authority and utilization of

98

Id.
For a more detailed examination of the Peretz decision, including discussion of the dissenting opinions in the case, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 16–21.
100 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice Reform, 67 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV. 799, 814–18 (1993).
102 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79–80.
103 See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 940.
104 See supra Part I.A.
99
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magistrate judges in the subsequent twenty-five years.105 The following parts of
our paper will describe examples of how courts expanded magistrate judge utilization and the various ways federal courts extended the authority of magistrate judges.
II. EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY
A. Supreme Court Cases Discussing Magistrate Judge Authority Since Peretz
Since the Peretz decision, the Supreme Court has decided two more cases
dealing with magistrate judge authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636: Roell v.
Withrow, concerning litigant consent in civil cases referred to magistrate judges
under § 636(c),106 and Gonzalez v. United States, concerning consent to a magistrate judge presiding over felony voir dire as an “additional duty” under
§ 636(b)(3).107 While neither case deals directly with the constitutionality of
magistrate judge authority under Article III, both cases have facilitated the expansion of magistrate judge authority in the district courts in recent years.
1. Roell v. Withrow
In Roell, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that consent to
disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge may be inferred in certain circumstances “from a party’s conduct during litigation.”108
Respondent Jon Withrow, a Texas state prisoner, filed an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of Texas against several prisoner officials, alleging that the officials “deliberately disregarded his medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”109 At a preliminary hearing, a magistrate
judge informed Withrow that he could choose to have the magistrate judge rather than a district judge preside over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).110
Withrow consented orally to disposition by the magistrate judge.111 But an attorney from the Texas attorney general’s office, who was not permanently assigned to the case, stated that she would need to talk to the attorneys assigned
to the case concerning consent.112
The district judge subsequently referred the case to the magistrate judge,
indicating that “all defendants [would] be given an opportunity to consent” to
disposition by the magistrate judge and that the referral would be withdrawn if

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

See supra Part I.A.
See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008).
Roell, 538 U.S. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 582–83.
Id. at 583.
Id.
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any of the defendants did not consent.113 After the clerk of court sent the referral order to all the defendants, which included a “summons directing them to
include [i]n their answer” a statement either that the defendants consented or
did not consent to disposition by the magistrate judge, only one defendant gave
written consent, while defendants Roell and Garibay filed answers that were
silent about consent.114
The case proceeded to a jury trial before the magistrate judge and all of the
parties voluntarily participated without raising any objections to the magistrate
judge’s authority.115 After a verdict was reached in favor of the defendants,
Withrow appealed to the Fifth Circuit.116 The circuit court sua sponte remanded
the case, instructing the district court to determine whether all the parties had
consented to trial before the magistrate judge.117 Only at this time did defendants Roell and Garibay file formal written consents with the district court.118
The district judge referred the remanded case back to the magistrate judge.119
The magistrate judge issued a report finding that, although Roell and Garibay
“by their actions [had] clearly implied their consent” to the magistrate judge’s
jurisdiction, under Fifth Circuit precedent, consent to disposition by a magistrate judge could not be implied by the parties’ conduct.120 The magistrate
judge therefore concluded that she did not have authority to try the case.121 After the district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the defendants again appealed to the Fifth Circuit.122 The appellate court
concluded that (1) consent to disposition by a magistrate judge under § 636(c)
must be express; (2) consent could not be implied by conduct; and (3) the two
defendants’ post-judgment consent did not satisfy the statutory consent requirement.123 After the court affirmed the district court’s ruling, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.124
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began by analyzing the text of
§ 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b):
The procedure created by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) thus envisions
advance, written consent communicated to the clerk, the point being to preserve
the confidentiality of a party’s choice, in the interest of protecting an objecting
party against any possible prejudice at the magistrate judge’s hands later on. 125
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 583–84.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 586.
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After acknowledging that what occurred in Withrow’s case did not conform to
these procedures, the majority stated:
Nonetheless, Roell and Garibay “clearly implied their consent” by their decision
to appear before the Magistrate Judge, without expressing any reservation, after
being notified of their right to refuse and after being told that she intended to exercise case-dispositive authority. The only question is whether consent so shown
can count as conferring “civil jurisdiction” under § 636(c)(1), or whether adherence to the letter of § 636(c)(2) is an absolute demand.126

The Court closely examined the text of § 636(c), noting the provision
merely requires “the consent of the parties” for disposition of a case before a
full-time magistrate judge.127 The Court contrasted this language with the provision allowing for consent to trial before part-time magistrate judges, noting
that the statute required “specific written consent” in that situation.128 Focusing
on this distinction, the majority reasoned that while the procedures set forth in
§ 636(c) and Rule 73(b) should not be considered merely advisory, a defect in
the referral of a civil consent case to a magistrate judge would not “eliminate
that magistrate judge’s ‘civil jurisdiction’ under § 636(c)(1) so long as the parties have in fact voluntarily consented.”129
The Court then emphasized Congress’s practical concerns in relieving civil
caseloads and granting “improve[d] access to the courts” as justification for
permitting a defendant’s implied consent in certain circumstances.130 Balancing
these considerations, Justice Souter noted that “the virtue of strict insistence on
the express consent requirement embodied in § 636(c)(2) is simply the value of
any bright line: here, absolutely minimal risk of compromising the right to an
Article III judge.”131 He also noted, however, that application of such a rule ran
the risk of wasting “a full and complicated trial . . . at the option of an undeserving and possibly opportunistic litigant.”132 Justice Souter reasoned that because “Withrow consented orally and in writing to the Magistrate Judge’s authority following notice of his right to elect trial by an Article III district
judge,” the plaintiff received the protection intended by the Federal Magistrates
Act, and therefore Withrow did not deserve to receive an advantage from some
of the defendants’ failure to expressly consent to the magistrate judge’s authority.133
Under the situation in this case, the majority concluded,
The bright line is not worth the downside. We think the better rule is to accept implied consent where, as here, the litigant or counsel was made aware of
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589–90.
Id. at 590.
Id.
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the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to
try the case before the Magistrate Judge. Inferring consent in these circumstances thus checks the risk of gamesmanship by depriving parties of the luxury of
waiting for the outcome before denying the magistrate judge’s authority. Judicial
efficiency is served; the Article III right is substantially honored. 134

Concluding that “Roell’s and Garbay’s general appearances before the
Magistrate Judge” after being informed of their right to adjudication by a district judge was sufficient to constitute consent to the magistrate judge’s authority under § 636(c), the Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment.135
The Court’s reasoning in Roell has significantly altered the meaning of
consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Whereas before, courts had routinely held
that a party’s consent to disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge had to
be “clear, unambiguous, explicit,” and on the record, if not necessarily in writing,136 Roell opened the door to the ambiguities of implied consent. Courts are
still wrestling with the implications raised by Roell.137 Moreover, as we shall
see, the majority’s reasoning in Roell was a major factor in the Supreme
Court’s recent decision concerning the consensual authority of bankruptcy
judges in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif.138
134

Id.
Id. at 591.
136 Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 223 (7th Cir. 1987); see, e.g., Am. Suzuki Motor Corp.
v. Bill Kummer, Inc., 65 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1995); Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644 (11th Cir.
1987); Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Ambrose v. Welch, 729
F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
137 See, e.g., Yeldon v. Fisher, 710 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a pro se plaintiff in
a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, who explicitly indicated on the consent
form at the beginning of his case that he did not consent to disposition of his case by a magistrate judge, could not be found to have impliedly consented to the magistrate judge’s authority under the reasoning of Roell, even though he participated in subsequent litigation before the magistrate judge); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
a prisoner plaintiff’s execution of the district court’s form consenting to disposition by “a
United States magistrate judge” was sufficient to constitute consent to have the case disposed of by another magistrate judge after the case was reassigned from the magistrate judge
who originally received the referral, and that the plaintiff’s conduct during litigation before
the second magistrate judge also constituted implied consent to disposition of the case by the
magistrate judge under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roell, even if the consent form
signed by the plaintiff was in some way defective); Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
481 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the reasoning in Roell and holding the plaintiff’s
original consent to disposition of her Title VII case by a magistrate judge under § 636(c),
combined with her conduct during pretrial proceedings before the magistrate judge in her
second, related civil rights employment case, together would be construed to constitute consent to having the magistrate judge dispose of the second case); Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466
F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding magistrate judge did not have authority to make a final
ruling on a foreign party’s application for assistance in obtaining discovery from non-party
witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, where there was no evidence that the parties consented to
the magistrate judge’s authority, and where there was no notification to the defendants or
their counsel of the need to consent or the right to refuse consent, Roell does not permit the
court to infer consent to the magistrate judge’s authority to act for the district court).
138 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). For a detailed analysis of the Wellness decision, see infra Section
II.C.1.b.
135
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2. Gonzalez v. United States
In Gonzalez v. United States, the Supreme Court held, in an eight to one
decision, that the express consent by a defendant’s attorney is sufficient to
permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial under
§ 636(b)(3).139
As in Gomez and Peretz, the Supreme Court focused on magistrate judge
authority to conduct felony voir dire proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)
to explore the nature of litigant consent to a magistrate judge.140 Defendant
Homero Gonzalez was charged in the Southern District of Texas with felony
drug offenses.141 During the selection of the jury at trial, Gonzalez’s counsel
consented on the defendant’s behalf to have a magistrate judge preside over
voir dire.142 Gonzalez made no objection and was subsequently convicted on all
charges.143 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Gonzalez contended “for the first
time” that the district court erred in not obtaining his personal consent to have
the magistrate judge preside over voir dire.144 The appellate court concluded
that there was no error, holding that the right to have a district judge preside
over jury selection could be waived by a defendant’s attorney, and thus affirmed the convictions.145 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari
to resolve a split among courts of appeals on this issue.146
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by examining the Federal
Magistrates Act, particularly the “additional duties” provision at 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b).147 Restating the Court’s earlier reasoning in Gomez and Peretz, he
framed the question before the Court as follows:
Taken together, Gomez and Peretz mean that “the additional duties” the
statute permits the magistrate judge to undertake include presiding at voir dire
and jury selection provided there is consent but not if there is an objection. We
now consider whether the consent can be given by counsel acting on behalf of
the client but without the client’s own express consent.148

The majority acknowledged that there are some instances in federal criminal proceedings where only the defendant can waive the right in question, citing as the primary example the felony plea colloquy under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11, where the presiding judge must determine whether the
defendant understands the rights he or she is waiving by pleading guilty.149 The
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
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Court also noted that some statutes mandate explicit consent by the defendant,
such as the waiver of adjudication by a district judge in Class A misdemeanor
cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b).150 Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) lacks
such clarity, the majority observed that “for now it suffices to note that we have
acknowledged that some rights cannot be waived by the attorney alone.”151
At the same time, however, the Court also observed that other rights in a
criminal trial may be waived by a defendant’s attorney as a matter of trial management.152 After noting the pragmatic necessity for counsel to make many decisions at trial on behalf of their clients, the Court observed that the question of
who should preside over voir dire in a felony trial was similar to other tactical
decisions that the Court had recognized could be left to the attorney without the
defendant’s express consent.153 The majority thus concluded “that express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, pursuant to the authorization in § 636(b)(3).”154 The Court
further observed:
Although a criminal defendant may demand that an Article III judge preside
over the selection of a jury, the choice to do so reflects considerations more significant to the realm of the attorney than to the accused. Requiring the defendant
to consent to a magistrate judge only by way of an on-the-record personal statement is not dictated by precedent and would burden the trial process, with little
added protection for the defendant.155

The Court therefore held that, under § 636(b)(3), a magistrate judge may
preside over voir dire in a felony case where either the defendant or his counsel
consented.156 After noting that it did not decide the question of whether such
consent might be inferred from either the party’s or his or her counsel’s failure
to raise an objection to participation by the magistrate judge, the Court affirmed
the court of appeal’s ruling.157
The Gonzalez decision is significant because it reaffirmed the Court’s earlier reasoning in Peretz that a defendant’s consent was sufficient to permit a
magistrate judge to conduct a critical stage of a felony criminal trial as an “additional dut[y]” under § 636(b)(3).158 Moreover, in rejecting the defendant’s argument that consent under § 636(b)(3) must be express and personal, the Court
also reaffirmed its holding in Roell that a party may authorize the disposition of
his civil case by a full-time magistrate judge via implied consent.159 Lower
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id.
Id. at 247–48.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 252.
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courts have applied the Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez to permit counsel to consent on behalf of defendants in other critical stages of a felony case.160
B. Judicial Expansion of Magistrate Judge Authority
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990161 did not end congressional expansion of magistrate judge authority. In the years following 1990, Congress on
several occasions amended the Federal Magistrates Act to increase magistrate
judge authority in both civil and criminal cases.162 Nevertheless, federal courts
have remained at the forefront in expanding magistrate judge authority (and
debating the nature of such expansion), often in ways unanticipated when the
Act was first enacted.
1. Felony Guilty Plea Proceedings Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11
Perhaps the most dramatic expansion of magistrate judge authority in the
past twenty-five years has been in the referral of guilty plea colloquies in felony cases under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to magistrate judges.
Applying the Supreme Court’s holding in Peretz that critical stages in felony
cases may be referred to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) with
the defendant’s consent, district judges throughout the country began to refer
guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges in increasing numbers.163
It is notable that courts increased the referral of felony Rule 11 plea proceedings to magistrate judges despite early disapproval of the practice by the
Magistrate Judges Committee. At its December 1991 meeting, the members of
the Committee expressed the “strong view that judicial duties in critical stages
of a felony trial, particularly the acceptance of guilty pleas and conducting sen160

See, e.g., United States v. Gamba, 541 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Gonzalez
and holding that defense counsel’s consent to having a magistrate judge preside over closing
arguments in a felony trial without the defendant’s express personal consent was lawful).
161 See supra Part I.B.
162 For detailed discussion of amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act that expanded
magistrate judges’ authority after 1990, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 93–97.
163 In the year ending on September 30, 2000, the first year that specific statistics on the
number of felony guilty plea proceedings were collected, magistrate judges reported conducting 10,614 felony guilty plea proceedings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, at tbl.M-4 (2000) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000],
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2000 [https://perma.cc/AQL77KVS]. In the year ending on September 30, 2014, magistrate judges reported conducting
29,536 felony guilty plea proceedings. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2014, at tbl.M-4 (2014) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014],
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2014 [https://perma.cc/23MRDZRN]. Although the number of guilty plea proceedings reported by magistrate judges in
2014 was down somewhat from the high of 33,334 felony guilty plea proceedings reported
in 2011, the number of these proceedings conducted by federal magistrate judges between
2000 and 2014 still almost tripled. See infra Section III.D.1 (analyzing the utilization of
magistrate judges in felony guilty plea proceedings).
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tencing proceedings, as well as presiding over the felony trial itself, are fundamental elements of the authority district judges under Article III of the Constitution.”164 The Committee further stated that felony guilty plea proceedings
should not be referred “to magistrate judges as a matter of policy, regardless of
whether the parties consent to the delegation.”165 This position concerning felony guilty pleas “was originally proposed for Judicial Conference consideration, but was withdrawn for further consideration at the Committee’s June 1992
meeting.”166
At its June 1992 meeting, the Magistrate Judges Committee, in an information item in its report to the September 1992 session of the Judicial Conference, reiterated its earlier position “that judicial duties in certain ‘critical stages
of felony cases, including accepting guilty pleas, conducting sentencing proceedings, and presiding over the trial of a felony case,’ ” are fundamental elements of the “authority of Article III judges and, therefore, were not appropriate for delegation to magistrate judges,” regardless of whether a defendant
consents to a Magistrate Judge’s involvement.167 Nevertheless, “[t]he Committee did not seek Judicial Conference endorsement of its position at that
time.”168
During long-range planning discussions, the majority of the Committee’s
members stated that the parties’ consent to magistrate judge authority in felony
proceedings reduced constitutional questions about such authority. By contrast,
a smaller number of the Committee’s members disagreed with this view and
reiterated concerns about the constitutionality of magistrate judges conducting
certain critical proceedings in felony cases.169 Accordingly, “the Committee
agreed that ‘it would be prudent to proceed cautiously, expanding the involvement of magistrate judges in felony matters on an experimental basis.’ ”170 After sessions devoted to the discussion of long-range planning for the federal
magistrate judges system, the Committee issued a report, where the Committee
wrote, “[t]he projected growth of the criminal caseload of the federal courts
makes the delegation of expanded consensual felony authority to magistrate
judges an increasingly acceptable alternative for courts attempting to manage
growing felony and civil dockets.”171 The Committee therefore suggested that
pilot programs might be set up in certain district courts where magistrate judges
would be permitted to conduct guilty plea proceedings and sentence felony de164

See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 56–57.
Id. at 57.
166 Id.
167 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 66 (quoting JCUS-MAR 1992, supra note 55, at
16–17); accord CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 57.
168 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 66.
169 Id.
170 Id. (quoting COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYS., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 5 (Supp.
June 1994) [hereinafter MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN]).
171 Id. at 66 (quoting MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN, supra note 170, at 4–6).
165
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fendants, with the parties’ consent and under the supervision and control of district judges.172 It also recommended that if federal courts found these programs
to be constitutional, “an additional experimental pilot program be established to
permit magistrate judges to try felony cases with consent.”173
The Committee, however, included these recommendations merely as information items to the September 1994 session of the Judicial Conference, and
the full Conference did not express any views on them.174 In addition, although
these recommendations were included in the Supplement to the Long Range
Plan, no district court set up any pilot programs.175 But the referral of felony
guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges expanded in numerous courts regardless of the changing views of the Committee.176
Every circuit court of appeals that has examined the issue of the referral of
felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges has concluded that the practice does not violate the Constitution and that “plea colloquies under [Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 in felony cases are additional duties that may
be delegated to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) with the defendants’ consent.”177 At the same time, however, courts have disagreed over
whether the magistrate judge may only issue a report recommending whether or
not the plea should be accepted by the district judge, or whether the magistrate
judge may actually accept the defendant’s plea. Cases on both sides of this disagreement are analyzed below.
a. Report and Recommendation with the Defendant’s Consent
Most circuit courts have held that a magistrate judge may conduct a felony
guilty plea proceeding under Rule 11 with the defendant’s consent, after which
the magistrate judge must prepare a report recommending whether the district
judge should accept the defendant’s plea.178 Several of these cases are discussed below.

172

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See infra Part III.D.1 for further analysis of the utilization of magistrate judges in felony
guilty plea proceedings.
177 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 67 n.228; see United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d
424, 433 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vega-Martinez, 425 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2005);
United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. ReynaTapia (Reyna-Tapia II), 328 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v.
Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 269 (5th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 629 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886,
891 (7th Cir. 2014) (addressing the defendant’s statutory, not constitutional, claim).
178 See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891; Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d at 1122; Torres, 258 F.3d at 796;
Dees, 125 F.3d at 269; Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.
173
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United States v. Williams

In 1994, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, became the first
federal appellate court to address whether a magistrate judge could constitutionally be referred a felony guilty plea proceeding with the defendant’s consent on a report and recommendation basis.179 The Second Circuit held that a
magistrate judge could administer the colloquy under Rule 11 to accept a defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case with the defendant’s consent without violating Article III of the Constitution or the Federal Magistrates Act.180 The
court further endorsed a procedure whereby the magistrate judge conducted the
Rule 11 allocution with the defendant’s consent and submitted a recommendation to the district judge regarding whether to accept the guilty plea.181
After defendant Lloyd Williams was arrested in 1991 and charged with
felony drug importation offenses in the Eastern District of New York, he consented in writing to have a magistrate judge conduct the proceeding to accept
his guilty plea.182 Following the district’s standard practice, a magistrate judge
conducted the plea allocution, made a finding that the guilty plea was made
knowingly and voluntarily by the defendant, and submitted a recommendation
to the district judge that Williams’s guilty plea be accepted.183 The district court
agreed, accepted Williams’s guilty plea, and sentenced him to 292 months of
imprisonment.184 Williams appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that allowing a magistrate judge to conduct the guilty plea colloquy under Rule 11 violated Article III of the Constitution and the Federal Magistrates Act, notwithstanding his consent to the procedure.185
The appellate court first examined whether the referral of felony guilty plea
proceedings to magistrate judges was permissible under the Federal Magistrates
Act.186 Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) was the provision of the Act that applied in this case, the court acknowledged it was bound by Gomez and
Peretz.187 The court further stated:
In order for a Rule 11 allocution properly to fall within the sphere of “additional duties” authorized by Congress in the Magistrates Act, it must bear some
relationship to those duties already assigned to magistrates by the Act. An allocution is an ordinary garden variety type of ministerial function that magistrate
judges commonly perform on a regular basis. The catechism administered to a
defendant is now a standard one, dictated in large measure by the comprehensive
provisions of Rule 11 itself, which carefully explain what a court must inquire
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

See Williams, 23 F.3d 629.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
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about, what it should advise a defendant and what it should determine before accepting a plea. Further, administrating an allocution is less complex than a number of duties the Magistrates Act specifically authorizes magistrates to perform.
For example, such judicial officers may hear and determine pretrial matters, other than eight dispositive motions. In addition, a magistrate may conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and submit to the district court recommended findings of fact for the eight dispositive motions, and do the same with
habeas petitions.188

The court also noted that even if guilty plea proceedings were of greater
importance than other duties specifically assigned to magistrate judges, “the
consent requirement—fulfilled in this case—saves the delegation. Consent is
the key.”189 The panel therefore held “that the ‘additional duties’ clause of the
Magistrates Act authorizes a district court judge in a felony prosecution to delegate to a magistrate judge the task of administering a Rule 11 allocution, provided the defendant consents.”190
Turning to the defendant’s constitutional argument, the court again relied
on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Peretz to conclude that the defendant’s consent was crucial to the constitutional analysis “because a defendant may waive
even his most basic rights.”191 The panel also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor192 to conclude
the structural protections of Article III are not implicated. Because the district
court remains in control of the proceeding, and the matter is reported to that
court for its approval, there should be no concern that the use of a magistrate
judge to allocute a defendant accused of a felony will tend to devitalize Article
III courts.193

The court observed that the district judge was free to review the transcript
of the Rule 11 colloquy and could re-administer the allocution if infirmities
were discovered.194 The court therefore concluded that the referral of the felony
guilty plea proceeding to the magistrate judge in Williams’s case did not contravene Article III of the Constitution and affirmed the district court’s judgment.195
As the first court of appeals case to address the issue of whether felony
guilty plea proceedings could be referred to magistrate judges without violating
the Federal Magistrates Act or the Constitution, the Williams decision has been

188

Id. at 632–33 (citations omitted).
Id. at 633.
190 Id. at 634.
191 Id.
192 478 U.S. 833 (1986). See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37, for a detailed analysis of Schor.
193 Williams, 23 F.3d at 634.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 634, 636.
189
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cited by almost all the courts of appeals that have addressed the question.196 Indeed, the Second Circuit’s analysis has served as a template for other courts examining the issue.
ii.

United States v. Reyna-Tapia I & II

The panel of the Ninth Circuit that issued the first opinion in United States
v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia I), came close to effectively ending the referral of
felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges in the Ninth Circuit by requiring district judges to conduct de novo review every time a magistrate judge
issued a report and recommendation after conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy,
even in cases where the defendant did not object to the recommendation.197 On
rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit backed away from the original
panel’s view and held that de novo review was only required when an objection
was made.198 Both decisions are discussed below.
In Reyna-Tapia I, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a magistrate judge
could, with the defendant’s consent, conduct a Rule 11 plea colloquy and recommend that a district judge accept a defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case,
provided that the district court conducted de novo review of the proceeding.199
Defendant Jose Reyna-Tapia was charged in the District of Arizona with illegal re-entry into the United States after being deported in 1999.200 After
agreeing to plead guilty to this charge, the defendant agreed to have a magistrate judge administer the Rule 11 plea colloquy.201 The magistrate judge conducted the proceeding and recommended that the defendant’s plea be accepted.
The district judge reviewed the record de novo before accepting the defendant’s
plea.202 After sentencing, Reyna-Tapia appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing
that the district court erred in permitting a magistrate judge to conduct the Rule
11 colloquy proceeding.203
The panel affirmed, but not without voicing numerous concerns about the
referral of felony guilty plea colloquies to magistrate judges. Noting that the
Supreme Court had observed in Gomez that the Federal Magistrates Act provides no jurisdiction for a magistrate judge to preside over an entire felony trial
196

See, e.g., United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1331
(11th Cir. 2004); Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United
States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 263
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996).
197 United States v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia I), 294 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2002),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated by 315 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
198 Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d at 1122.
199 Reyna-Tapia I, 294 F.3d at 1201.
200 Id. at 1194.
201 Id. at 1194–95.
202 Id. at 1195.
203 Id. at 1194–95.
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simply because a defendant consents to that authority,204 the Ninth Circuit stated that “a felony plea colloquy constitutes a sensitive and critical stage of a
criminal prosecution where the same rights are at stake as with felony trials and
the court must exercise similar discretion.”205 Emphasizing the importance of a
judge’s observations and impressions of a defendant in evaluating voluntariness
of the defendant’s guilty plea, the panel noted, “De novo review, which entails
a reading of a cold transcript, acts as a poor substitute for these first-hand impressions.”206 It further opined that “[c]onsent may be insufficient to cure the
problems involved with the delegation of Rule 11 duties to a non-Article III
judge.”207
The court was particularly concerned with the delegation of the duty to inquire into the factual basis of the guilty plea under Rule 11(f):
Rule 11(f) is designed to protect defendants who do not realize that their
conduct does not actually fall within the charge. Only the sentencing judge has
the benefit of the presentence report, which may reveal additional facts showing
that the defendant’s conduct does not fall within the charge to which he is pleading. To delegate this responsibility to a magistrate judge, who will conduct the
inquiry without the benefit of the presentence report, dilutes the important safeguard in Rule 11(f).208

In light of these concerns, the court placed particular importance on having
the district judge conduct de novo review in all circumstances where a magistrate judge conducted the Rule 11 colloquy.209
Even with these reservations, the court acknowledged that four other circuits had already concluded that the duty of conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy
was a duty comparable in responsibility to other duties assigned to magistrate
judges under the Federal Magistrates Act.210 The panel however specifically
departed from the reasoning used by the Second Circuit in Williams to justify
the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges:
We disagree with the Second Circuit that a Rule 11 plea colloquy is a “garden variety ministerial function.” . . . [A] plea colloquy is a highly critical stage
of a criminal prosecution. However, we recognize the weight of authority holding that magistrate[ judges] may perform this function with the defendant’s consent, and we join our sister circuits in acknowledging that Congress intended to
give district courts significant leeway to experiment with the use of magistrate[
judges]. Therefore, we hold that, when a defendant explicitly consents, a magistrate judge may administer the Rule 11 plea colloquy in a felony case, so long as
the district court reviews the proceedings de novo.211
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989).
Reyna-Tapia I, 294 F.3d at 1199.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1200 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1201.
See id. at 1200.
Id. at 1200–01.
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The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Reyna-Tapia had not provided an adequate reason for withdrawing his plea and that the district court’s referral of
Rule 11 duties to the magistrate judge “was proper under the circumstances of
this case.”212 Nevertheless, the court appeared to mandate that de novo review
must occur whenever a magistrate judge conducted a Rule 11 guilty plea proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit panel’s decision in Reyna-Tapia I cast doubt on the efficacy of district judges referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate
judges by emphasizing the need for de novo review every time a magistrate
judge conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, even when a defendant did not object. By
suggesting that de novo determination was mandatory in all cases, the panel
undermined the time-saving rationale for such referrals. If a district judge was
required to conduct de novo review of every plea allocution handled by a magistrate judge, what was the purpose of, or efficiency in, delegating such duties?
While we do not know whether these concerns were brought to the attention of
the judges of the Ninth Circuit, six months after the panel issued the opinion in
Reyna-Tapia I, the Ninth Circuit en banc granted rehearing of the case and vacated the first decision.213
In May 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc opinion in United States
v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia II).214 The court held that Rule 11 plea colloquies
in felony cases are additional duties that may be delegated to magistrate judges
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) for findings and recommendations with the defendants’ consent.215 The court further held that de novo review of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in a guilty plea proceeding is mandated only when a party specifically objects to them.216
Noting that a defendant has at least three procedural safeguards available
when a magistrate judge conducts a guilty plea proceeding (consent to the magistrate judge, objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
and the right to withdraw the guilty plea prior to its acceptance by the district
court), the court reasoned:
[I]t merits re-emphasis that the underlying purpose of the Federal Magistrates
Act is to improve the effective administration of justice. A rule requiring automatic de novo review of findings and recommendations to which no one objects
would not save time or judicial resources. It would do just the opposite, and defeat the whole purpose of referring the plea to the magistrate judge. 217
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Id. at 1201.
See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 315 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
214 328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
215 Id. at 1116, 1122.
216 Id. at 1116.
217 Id. at 1121–22 (citation omitted) (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928
(1991)).
213
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The Ninth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
iii.

United States v. Harden

The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Harden, is the latest court to address the issue of referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges.218 In Harden, the court held that a magistrate judge conducting a Rule 11
guilty plea colloquy could not accept the defendant’s guilty plea at the conclusion of the colloquy, but was required to issue a report to the district judge recommending whether to accept the plea.219
Defendant Stacy Harden agreed to plead guilty in the Southern District of
Illinois to a drug charge and consented to a magistrate judge conducting the
plea colloquy.220 Following the colloquy, the magistrate judge accepted Harden’s guilty plea.221 The district judge then conducted a sentencing hearing and
imposed a within-guidelines sentence.222 Harden appealed his conviction, raising for the first time his objection to the magistrate judge’s authority to accept a
guilty plea in a felony case.223
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the taking of a felony guilty plea is
“too important to be considered a mere ‘additional duty’ permitted” under the
Federal Magistrates Act.224 Because of the importance of this task, the court
held that the Act “cannot be stretched to reach acceptance of felony guilty
pleas, even with a defendant’s consent.”225 Noting that its view of the Act conflicted with several other circuits,226 the Seventh Circuit nonetheless concluded:
[T]he prevalence of guilty pleas does not render them less important, or the protections waived through them any less fundamental. A felony guilty plea is equal
in importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty. And without explicit
authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task. 227

Noting that the conflicting authority had emphasized the Supreme Court’s
statement in Peretz that “Congress intended to give federal judges significant
leeway to experiment with possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process,”228 the Seventh Circuit closed its decision by stating:
218

United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 891.
220 Id. at 887.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 887–88.
224 Id. at 888.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 891 (citing United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432–32 (4th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ciapponi, 77
F.3d 1247, 1250–52 (10th Cir. 1996)).
227 Id.
228 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991).
219
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The desire to make more efficient the district courts’ management of large
criminal caseloads is understandable. These days, over 97% of criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Truly, “criminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” . . . A felony guilty plea is equal in
importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty. And without explicit
authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task.
The authority to experiment set forth in Peretz is bounded; the Court has never
suggested that magistrate judges, with the parties’ consent, may perform every
duty of an Article III judge, regardless of the duty’s importance. 229

Acknowledging efficiency concerns, the appellate court held that a magistrate judge may conduct a Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy, but that the judge must
issue a report to the district court with a recommendation on the plea.230 The
court agreed with other circuits that “this is a permissible practice.”231 Because
the magistrate judge in Harden had actually accepted his plea, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.232
The main thrust of the decision in Harden was a rejection of the view that a
magistrate judge may accept the defendant’s plea in a felony case after the Rule
11 colloquy. Since Harden, other circuits have continued to adhere to their
precedent that magistrate judges may accept a felony guilty plea.233 The Seventh Circuit’s Harden decision emphatically highlights the disagreement existing among the courts of appeals as to whether a magistrate judge can accept a
defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case.
b. Magistrate Judge’s Acceptance of Guilty Plea
At present, two courts of appeals have taken the position that magistrate
judges not only may conduct felony guilty plea proceedings under Rule 11 with
the consent of the defendant, but also that magistrate judges may accept defendants’ pleas without preparing a report and recommendation to the district
judge.234 The Ciapponi and Benton decisions are discussed below.

229

Harden, 758 F.3d at 891–92 (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1388 (2012)).
230 Id. at 891.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 892.
233 See, e.g., United States v. Shropshire, 608 F. App’x 143, 143 (4th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Farmer, 599 F. App’x 525, 526 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ross, 602 F. App’x
113, 114 (4th Cir. 2015).
234 See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ciapponi, 77
F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
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United States v. Ciapponi

The Tenth Circuit was the first court of appeals to endorse the view that a
magistrate judge may accept a felony defendant’s guilty plea with the defendant’s consent.235
Defendant George Ciapponi was arrested in the District of New Mexico
and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute.236 When
Ciapponi agreed to a plea agreement, the district judge referred the guilty plea
proceeding to a magistrate judge.237 After being informed that he had a right to
appear before a district judge, Ciapponi, with the advice of counsel, executed a
written consent to have his plea accepted by the magistrate judge.238 The magistrate judge then conducted a Rule 11 plea colloquy and accepted the defendant’s guilty plea.239 At the later sentencing proceeding before the district judge,
Ciapponi did not object to the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the plea.240
The defendant’s first objection to the plea proceeding was raised on appeal,
where he argued that the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the guilty plea violated the Federal Magistrates Act and Article III of the Constitution.241 The
Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. The court observed that the defendant’s
failure to object or otherwise request review of the plea in the district court undercut his claim of a constitutional violation and that the court would review
Ciapponi’s claim under the plain error standard.242 Citing with approval the
Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Williams,243 the court held that
“[c]onsistent with Peretz and Williams, . . . with a defendant’s express consent,
the broad residuary ‘additional duties’ clause of the Magistrates Act authorizes
a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 felony plea proceeding, and such does
not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”244
The court further concluded that the district judge’s failure to conduct de
novo review of the plea proceeding was insignificant, reasoning that “neither
the Magistrates Act nor Article III requires that a referral be conditioned on
subsequent review by the district judge, so long as a defendant’s right to demand an Article III judge is preserved.”245 The court noted that the right to Article III review in a felony guilty plea proceeding is protected by Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32(d), which allows a defendant to move to withdraw a

235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245

See Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249–50.
23 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 1994).
Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1251.
Id. at 1251–52.
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guilty plea prior to sentencing.246 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the availability of the Rule 32 withdrawal procedure adequately protected a defendant’s
rights under Article III.247 The court therefore held that the magistrate judge did
not err in accepting Ciapponi’s guilty plea and affirmed the district court’s
judgment.248
ii.

United States v. Benton

In United States v. Benton, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit in holding that a magistrate judge had the authority to accept a defendant’s felony guilty plea with the consent of the defendant without the preparation of a report and recommendation.249
After defendant Cedric Benton was arrested in the Western District of
North Carolina on drug charges, he entered into a plea agreement where he
agreed to allow a “duly-qualified federal Magistrate Judge” to conduct his Rule
11 plea colloquy.250 At the plea hearing, Benton affirmatively consented to the
magistrate judge’s authority.251 He also stipulated that there was a factual basis
for the plea and agreed to defer the district court’s confirmation of this stipulation until the sentencing hearing before a district judge.252 After conducting the
plea colloquy, the magistrate judge “accepted Benton’s plea, finding it to be
both knowing and voluntary.”253 After the guilty plea proceeding, however,
Benton changed counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea.254 The district
judge denied Benton’s motion, concluding that the defendant “had not established a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea.”255 The district judge entered a final judgment of conviction and sentenced Benton to 262 months in
prison and a ten-year term of supervised release.256 Benton appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.257
On appeal, Benton argued that the magistrate judge did not have authority
to “accept” his guilty plea under Rule 11 and that therefore the district court
should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea for “any reason or no rea-

246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257

Id. at 1252.
Id.
Id. at 1253.
United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431–33 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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son” under Rule 11(d)(1).258 The Fourth Circuit reviewed for plain error, noting
that Benton failed to raise this argument before the district court.259
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz, the court held that
“magistrate judges possess the authority to bind defendants to their plea for the
purposes of Rule 11, so long as district judges retain the authority to review the
magistrate judge’s actions de novo.”260 On the question of whether a magistrate
judge may actually accept the defendant’s plea, rather than issuing a report and
recommendation, the court opined that the “distinction between plea colloquy
and plea acceptance does not appear to necessitate different results under
Peretz. . . . [T]he acceptance of a plea is merely the natural culmination of a
plea colloquy.”261
The court summarized its ruling:
We thus find that the district court did not commit error in refusing to allow
Benton to withdraw his plea “for any or no reason.” . . . [A]cceptance of a plea is
a duty that does not exceed the responsibility and importance of the more complex tasks a magistrate [judge] is explicitly authorized to perform, the parties
have consented to the procedure, and the ultimate control of the district judge
over the plea process alleviates any constitutional concerns. And just as a practical matter, allowing magistrate judges to accept pleas for the purposes of Rule
11 preserves judicial resources—the very goal underlying the creation of the office of magistrate judge—and prevents litigants from exploiting bifurcated plea
procedures.262

The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and Benton’s conviction
and sentence.263
As noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit has recently reaffirmed its holding in
Benton in three decisions issued after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Harden.264
iii.

United States v. Woodard & Brown v. United States

Eight years after the Ciapponi decision, the Eleventh Circuit also endorsed
a procedure where a magistrate judge accepts the defendant’s guilty plea after
conducting the Rule 11 colloquy. In United States v. Woodard, the court held
that § 636(b)(3) authorized a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 proceeding
with the defendant’s consent and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea, and that
the delegation of the authority to conduct such proceedings did not offend the
principles of Article III.265 Ten years later, however, the Eleventh Circuit, in a
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

Id.
Id. at 429.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 435.
See supra note 233.
United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004).
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footnote in Brown v. United States, clarified its holding in Woodard to conclude that a felony guilty plea proceeding conducted by a magistrate judge
should always be considered “akin to a report and recommendation rather than
a final adjudication of guilt.”266 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit has become
the only circuit court to change its position concerning felony guilty plea proceedings from permitting magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas to requiring the issuance of a report and recommendation in such proceedings. Both
cases are discussed below.
Defendant David Woodard was charged in the Southern District of Florida
with being a felon in possession of a firearm.267 After Woodard signed a plea
agreement, a magistrate judge conducted a change of plea hearing under Rule
11. After Woodard expressly consented, the magistrate judge accepted his
guilty plea and adjudged Woodard guilty of the firearm offense. When a district
judge later sentenced him, Woodard did not object to the sentence or to having
the plea colloquy conducted by a magistrate judge.268 On appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit, however, Woodward asserted for the first time that, although he had
specifically consented to having the magistrate judge conduct the guilty plea
proceeding, the magistrate judge had no statutory or constitutional authority to
accept Woodward’s guilty plea or to adjudicate him guilty of a felony.269
The Eleventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) authorized a magistrate judge, with the defendant’s consent, to conduct a Rule 11 colloquy in a
felony case and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea. Noting that several courts
of appeals had addressed the statutory issue, the court noted:
Like our sister circuits, we find that conducting a Rule 11 proceeding is
comparable to the [Federal Magistrates Act]’s enumerated duties. Therefore, we
join our sister circuits in similarly holding that a magistrate judge has the authority under the “additional duties” clause of [the Act] to conduct Rule 11 proceedings when the defendant consents.270

Turning to Woodard’s constitutional argument, the court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz, focusing on whether delegating certain duties to a magistrate judge would offend the structural protections provided by
Article III.271 It noted that in Peretz,
the Court held the structural protections of Article III are not jeopardized when
magistrate judges conduct voir dire because district judges still exert ultimate
control over magistrate judges. The Court explained that because district judges
have supervisory power over magistrate judges, “there is no danger that use of

266

See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014). See infra Part
II.B.2.b.i(b) for a detailed analysis of the Brown decision.
267 Woodard, 387 F.3d at 1330.
268 Id. at 1330–31.
269 Id. at 1331.
270 Id. at 1333.
271 Id.
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the magistrate involves a congressional attemp[t] to transfer jurisdiction [to nonArticle III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”272

The court further applied the Peretz analysis to conclude that the possibility of de novo review by a district judge removed any suggestion that Article III
authority was being undermined when particular matters were referred to magistrate judges.273 In response to Woodard’s argument that the procedure used in
his case was improper because the magistrate judge accepted his guilty plea rather than issuing a report and recommendation, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that the critical factor in all cases examining the referral of guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges “was that a district court, as a matter of law, retained
the ability to review the Rule 11 hearing if requested.”274 Woodard did not request that the district judge review the guilty plea proceeding and therefore “the
magistrate judge did not appropriate the district judge’s ultimate decisionmaking authority.”275 The appellate court thus concluded that “there was no
plain error, statutory or constitutional, with the magistrate judge accepting the
Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him guilty.”276
Although the Eleventh Circuit panel that decided Brown held that a federal
habeas corpus case arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not a civil matter that
could be disposed of by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the court,
in a lengthy footnote at the end of its opinion, clarified its holding in Woodard
regarding the procedures to be followed when magistrate judges conduct felony
guilty plea proceedings.277
Noting that the panel in Woodard had “described somewhat imprecisely
the circumstances giving rise to the appeal, which thus slightly muddled our
constitutional holding,” the court further reasoned,
We held in Woodard that “there was no error, statutory or constitutional, in
the magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him
guilty.” But that holding overlooked the mechanics of the district court’s actions
in that case. For although the magistrate judge purported to adjudge the defendant guilty, it was the district court that actually entered judgment. That is, the
magistrate judge did not make the final adjudication of guilt.
We noted in Woodard that different magistrate judges categorized their actions as an acceptance of a plea or a report and recommendation, “reveal[ing] a
lack of uniformity in the language used by magistrate judges.” . . . We believe
that there is value in uniformity; thus we clarify today that the magistrate judge’s

272

Id. at 1333–34 (alterations in original) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923,
937 (1991)).
273 Id. at 1334.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014). See infra Part
II.B.2.b.i(b) for a detailed discussion of the holding and reasoning in Brown.
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action in such proceedings are akin to a report and recommendation rather than a
final adjudication of guilt.278

The Eleventh Circuit therefore appeared to back away from its earlier holding in Woodard that seemed to validate a procedure where a magistrate judge
could accept a felony defendant’s guilty plea after conducting the Rule 11 colloquy with the defendant’s consent. It became the first circuit court to change
its position on this issue. Interestingly, the court chose to do this in a footnote
in a case that did not involve guilty plea proceedings under Rule 11. Moreover,
to date this language has only been cited in one unpublished decision from the
Eleventh Circuit.279 While the court intended to clarify the practical procedures
to be followed by magistrate judges when referred Rule 11 proceedings, it remains unclear to what extent magistrate judges are aware of this change in the
circuit’s law.
c.

Conclusion

Despite the disagreement among the courts of appeals concerning whether
a magistrate judge may accept a defendant’s felony guilty plea after conducting
the Rule 11 colloquy, the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) is a widely accepted practice across
the country. Of course, district judges do not uniformly favor this practice and
there remain principled arguments against the delegation of these duties to
magistrate judges. Nevertheless, the cases analyzed above demonstrate the
wide application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz to justify a significant expansion of magistrate judge authority throughout the nation.
2. Issues in Civil Consent Cases
Setting aside for a moment the broader issue of whether the civil consent
authority of magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 626(c) violates Article III of
the Constitution,280 courts have also dealt with several issues regarding the extent of magistrate judge authority in civil consent cases, including whether
magistrate judges have authority to rule on issues involving parties who have
not consented to the magistrate judge’s authority under § 626(c), whether magistrate judges may dispose of federal and state habeas corpus cases with consent, and whether district courts may use “opt out” procedures, where the liti-

278

Brown, 748 F.3d at 1071 n.53 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
See United States v. Millender, No. 15-10024, 2015 WL 7750663 (11th Cir. Dec. 2,
2015).
280 For a detailed discussion of the appellate cases dealing with the constitutionality of 28
U.S.C. § 626(c) that were issued after the initial enactment, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 21, at 41–54. For a detailed discussion of two recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with the constitutionality of bankruptcy judge authority under Article III, see Wellness Int’l
Network, Ltd. V. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011),
and infra Section II.C.1.
279
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gants’ failure to act may be deemed to be implied consent to disposition by a
magistrate judge.
a. Magistrate Judge Authority in Class Action Consent Cases to
Issue Rulings that Are Binding on Non-Consenting Parties
Several appellate courts have considered whether a magistrate judge presiding in a class action case with the consent of the parties has the authority to
issue rulings that are binding on litigants that have not individually consented
to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
These cases are reviewed below.
i.

Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc.

In Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that where the representative plaintiff in a class action case consented
to a magistrate judge disposing of the case, the presiding magistrate judge had
the authority to enjoin related litigation begun by an absent class member in
another district.281
Plaintiff Stacey Williams filed a class action suit against General Electric
Capital Automobile Lease, Inc (GECAL) in the Northern District of Illinois
challenging provisions of automobile leases issued by GECAL under the Consumer Leasing Act.282 The named parties consented to have the case disposed
of by a magistrate judge.283 The magistrate judge certified a national class and
eventually approved a settlement.284 Unnamed plaintiffs filed a virtually identical class action suit against GECAL in the Middle District of Florida.285
GECAL moved in the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin further prosecution
of the case in Florida.286 The magistrate judge granted the injunction, and the
Florida plaintiffs appealed.287
On appeal, the Florida plaintiffs argued that the magistrate judge did not
have the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to enjoin them because they had
not consented to have the magistrate judge preside over the case.288 The Seventh Circuit, while noting that unanimous and voluntary consent is the constitutional “linchpin” to magistrate judge authority under § 636(c), concluded that
the Florida plaintiffs, as unnamed members of the class, were not full “parties”

281

Williams v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269–70 (7th Cir.
1998).
282 Id. at 268.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 272.
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to the Illinois lawsuit because they could not direct the litigation.289 Thus, the
named class representative plaintiff’s consent to the magistrate judge’s authority was binding on other members of the class.290 The unnamed members did
not challenge the class representative’s consent to magistrate judge disposition
even after receiving notice of a proposed settlement that named the magistrate
judge as the presiding judge.291 Accordingly, the court held that the magistrate
judge had authority to enter the injunction and that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.292 The court also concluded that the injunction
was properly granted on its merits.293
ii.

Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft

In Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, the Third Circuit held that a
magistrate judge who was presiding over a class action in the District of New
Jersey with the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not abuse
her discretion by denying an absent class member’s motion to intervene in the
case to challenge the magistrate judge’s authority in the case, even though the
absent class member had not personally consented to disposition of the case by
the magistrate judge.294
Numerous plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against defendants
Volkswagen and Audi for alleged design defects in vehicles manufactured by
the defendants that resulted in leaking sunroofs.295 After the magistrate judge
initially approved a settlement of the class action and calculated attorney’s fees,
the case was appealed to the Third Circuit and subsequently reversed and remanded.296 On remand, the magistrate judge approved a revised settlement
agreement of the class action and once again calculated the attorney’s fees
award.297 Absent class member Peter Braverman moved to intervene in the case
to challenge the magistrate judge’s authority to approve the settlement and to
award attorney’s fees.298 The magistrate judge denied the motion to intervene,
and Braverman appealed to the Third Circuit.299 The appellees argued that
Braverman should have objected to the magistrate judge’s ruling in the district
court and had therefore waived the argument on appeal.300 Two other class
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Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 274–75.
Id. at 270, 275.
Id. at 275.
Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 558 F. App’x 191, 198–99 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 194.
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 194–95.
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members also appealed, challenging the magistrate judge’s calculation of attorney’s fee.301
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that Braverman had not consented to the magistrate judge’s authority and, following circuit precedent, had
applied to the district judge originally assigned to the case to hear his motion to
intervene under Rule 24(a).302 Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that
the magistrate judge had the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) to rule on
Braverman’s motion even absent the consent of the parties.303 The court, assuming without deciding that Braverman had not waived his right to appeal,
further held that the magistrate judge did not err in denying the motion because
Braverman failed to rebut the presumption that his interests were aligned with
those of the named plaintiffs.304 The court reasoned, “The mere fact that he objected is insufficient to rebut the presumption of aligned interests.”305 The court
also noted that Braverman could point to nothing in the record to suggest that
there was “any conflict of interest between the plaintiffs and class counsel.”306
The magistrate judge’s denial of the motion to intervene was therefore not an
abuse of discretion, and Braverman’s lack of consent to the magistrate judge’s
authority under § 636(c) did not prevent the magistrate judge from ruling on the
motion.307
iii.

Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC

In Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit held that a magistrate judge in the Middle District of Florida had authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) to approve a settlement agreement and dispose of a class action case
involving approximately 125,000 consumers, even though absent class members did not consent to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge.308
Plaintiff Miranda Day brought a class action lawsuit in the Middle District
of Florida on behalf of herself and a class of 10,000 similarly situated Florida
residents against several debt management companies and associated legal service providers.309 The class alleged violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Credit Repair Organization Act, and other common law provisions.310 Day and the legal service providers “consented to have
a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings and . . . to enter a final judgment”
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Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013).
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under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).311 After Day filed an amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), Day and the legal service providers “notified the court that they had reached an agreement in principle on the resolution of the case.”312 The final settlement agreement “defined the class as all
persons in the United States who had entered into agreements for legal advice
concerning debt with the legal service defendants on or after April 28, 2008,
except those consumers who were class members in a class action pending in
the Eastern District of Washington.”313 The class included over 125,000 absent
plaintiffs.314
The settlement agreement limited the legal service defendants’ ability to
collect fees from class members, placed other duties on these defendants, required the defendants to pay the costs of administering the settlement, provided
for a $5,000 incentive payment to Day, and required the defendants to pay attorney’s fees up to $300,000.315 However, the agreement provided no monetary
relief to the absent plaintiffs and released any claims by absent plaintiffs
against the legal service defendants.316 Although five class members objected
to the settlement, the magistrate judge, after a fairness hearing, approved the
settlement agreement, “certified the class, awarded class counsel $300,000, and
awarded Day $5,000.”317 The magistrate judge also made findings that six of
the defendants were financially unable to satisfy the judgment.318 The magistrate judge’s judgment was subsequently appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.319
The appellate court concluded that the consent of the representative party
in the class action was binding on the absent class members and that the magistrate judge’s disposition of the class action case with the consent of representative parties did not violate Article III of the Constitution.320 The court rejected
an argument that § 636(c) is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stern v. Marshall, the 2011 case holding that a bankruptcy judge
could not rule on a state court counterclaim arising in a “core” proceeding,
which will be analyzed later in this paper.321 However, the panel further held
that the magistrate judge had abused his discretion by concluding that six of the
seven defendants were unable to satisfy the judgment.322 The court therefore

311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1313–14.
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id. at 1314, 1316.
Id. at 1312, 1326–27.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1324.
See id. at 1323–24. For a detailed analysis of the Stern case, see infra at Section II.C.1.a.
Day, 729 F.3d at 1326–27.
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vacated the final judgment and remanded the case to the magistrate judge for
further proceedings.323
One panel member sitting by designation, Senior Judge Philip Pro from the
District of Nevada, issued a lengthy opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.324 He would have held that consent by the absent plaintiffs was required
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c):
Day did not have the authority to consent to a magistrate judge on behalf of the
unnamed class members before class certification. Following conditional class
certification, Day consented to the magistrate judge on her own behalf through
her litigation conduct by voluntarily appearing before the magistrate judge at the
fairness hearing. Of the 125,011 class members, Day was the only non-objecting
class member to appear personally or through counsel. However, Day’s postcertification implied consent to the magistrate judge did not bind the unnamed
class members because, upon certification, unnamed class members become later-added “parties” whose consent is required under § 636(c)(1).325

Judge Pro also stated that he “would hold that the unnamed class members
became ‘parties’ upon certification whose express or implied consent was required under § 636(c)(1),” and that “the magistrate judge lacked authority to
approve the class action settlement because Day’s post-certification implied
consent to the magistrate judge operated only on her own behalf, and the unnamed class members did not satisfy § 636(c)(1)’s consent requirement.”326
At least one academic commentator focused on Judge Pro’s dissenting
opinion in Day to argue that magistrate judges should not be involved in class
action cases with the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).327
iv.

Stackhouse v. McKnight

By contrast with decisions in the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the
Second Circuit, in Stackhouse v. McKnight, held that a magistrate judge did not
have authority to rule on a motion to intervene in a class action case where the
parties seeking to intervene had not consented to disposition of the case by a
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).328
The plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of New
York asserting unfair lending practices in violation of federal and state statutes.329 After the parties reached a proposed agreement to settle the law suit,
they consented to have the case disposed of by a magistrate judge under 28

323

Id. at 1328.
See id. at 1328 (Pro, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
325 Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).
326 Id. at 1339.
327 See Elizabeth French, Respecting the Linchpin: Why Absentee Consent Should Limit
Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 32, 35 (2015).
328 Stackhouse v. McKnight, 168 F. App’x 464, 466 (2d Cir. 2006).
329 Id. at 465.
324
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U.S.C. § 636(c).330 The presiding magistrate judge subsequently issued an order
preliminarily approving of the settlement agreement and gave class members
over two months to submit objections to the settlement.331 In response, several
class members moved to intervene in the case and also moved to vacate the
consensual reference of the case to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).332 The magistrate judge denied the motions and the case was appealed
to the Second Circuit.333
The Second Circuit concluded that it could not review the magistrate
judge’s decision because it was not a final judgment.334 Citing circuit precedent, the court reaffirmed, “A magistrate judge’s decision can constitute a final
judgment only on the consent of all parties to the dispute.”335 When only the
original parties in a case have consented to disposition by a magistrate judge, “a
district judge must rule on a motion to intervene brought by a third party.”336
Examining the record, the court could not conclude that the objectors had given
their consent to the disposition of their motion to intervene by a magistrate.337
Although the court acknowledged that the objectors did not specifically object
to the fact that the magistrate judge had made findings, it concluded—based on
Roell—that “this by itself does not evidence consent.”338 The court thus concluded that the magistrate judge’s order on the motion to intervene was the
equivalent of a report and recommendation subject to de novo review by the
district judge, not a final judgment that could be reviewed by the appellate
court.339 The Second Circuit therefore vacated and remanded the magistrate
judge’s judgment to the district court for further proceedings.340
b. Authority in Habeas Corpus Cases Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–
2255
While the constitutionality of civil consent authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) was affirmed by all courts of appeals that considered the issue in the
years following the amendment of the Federal Magistrates Act in 1979,341 some
330

Id.
Id.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 467.
335 Id. at 466.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. (“At best . . . the evidence is inconclusive with respect to the parties’ intent. This is
not enough to demonstrate consent.”).
339 Id. at 467.
340 Id.
341 See Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Va.
Dep’t. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma
Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding an appeal that challenged the
constitutionality of § 636(c) “abusive of the judicial process” and grounds for an award of
331
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judges continue to express concerns about the constitutionality of magistrate
judge consent authority with regard to federal habeas corpus petitions arising
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. Decisions in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
demonstrate particular unease with magistrate judges disposing of motions to
vacate sentences imposed by a district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the
consent of the parties. These cases are discussed below.
i.

Federal Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2255
(a) United States v. Johnston

In United States v. Johnston, the Fifth Circuit held that the consensual disposition of a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers set forth in Article III of the Constitution.342
Defendant Edward Johnston was convicted in federal court on felony drug
charges in the Southern District of Texas.343 After his conviction was affirmed
on direct appeal, Johnston filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging
the validity of his trial and sentence.344 Both Johnston and the government consented to have a magistrate judge dispose of the matter.345 “Johnston timely
filed a notice of appeal” after “[t]he magistrate judge issued a memorandum
and order denying Johnston’s § 2255 motion.”346 “The magistrate judge construed the notice of appeal as a motion for a [Certificate of Appealability] and
denied it . . . .”347 Johnston then filed another motion for a Certificate of Appealability with the Fifth Circuit.348
The Fifth Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of whether the magistrate
judge had proper jurisdiction to dispose of the § 2255 motion.349 The court first
attorney’s fees against the party raising the issue); Fields v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742
F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp.,
739 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704–05 (11th
Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729
F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix,
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721
F.2d 922, 923 (3d Cir. 1983); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 41–53
(analyzing Pacemaker, Wharton-Thomas, Collins, and Geras). See infra Section II.C.1 for a
detailed analysis of recent Supreme Court cases concerning the constitutionality of bankruptcy judge authority in certain “core” proceedings.
342 United States v Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2001).
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 See id. at 363–64. Although federal habeas corpus petitions arising under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 are described as motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a criminal sentence, they are
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explored the issue of whether motions under § 2255 should be considered civil
or criminal matters, and held that, “for purposes of § 636(c), a § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter over which Congress intended magistrate judges to exercise
jurisdiction upon consent of the parties.”350 The court then confronted the constitutional issue of whether the delegation of § 2255 matters to magistrate judges with consent violated Article III. Applying the Supreme Court’s holding set
forth in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, that Article III protects both litigants’ rights and structural guarantees that ensure respect for separation-of-powers principles,351 the court recognized that the parties had waived
their personal rights to Article III protection through their consent.352 The Fifth
Circuit therefore concluded that the only issue before it was “whether the delegation of the § 2255 motion pursuant to § 636(c) offended the structural guarantees of Article III.”353
The court began by noting that “a § 2255 motion does not easily comport
with the average civil case or even another quasi-civil proceeding such as a
§ 2254 petition and, consequently, presents three major problems” under Article III.354 First, unlike other civil matters, “a § 2255 motion directly questions
the validity of a prior federal court ruling.”355 The court found this troubling:
“If the parties to a § 2255 motion consent to proceed before a magistrate judge,
that magistrate judge could attack the validity of an Article III judge’s rulings.
Such an act clearly raises Article III concerns because judges without lifetime
tenure and undiminishable compensation would have controlling authority.”356
The second problem the court articulated was the fact that the consensual
disposition of a § 2255 motion by a magistrate judge may embroil the magistrate judge in an integral part of a federal felony trial, namely sentencing, which
is not ministerial in nature, and “may need the shield of independence afforded
Article III jurists.”357 Finally, the court, noting that only the court of appeals
can review a magistrate judge’s ruling in a case heard with consent, concluded
that the district court lacked sufficient supervision and control over the magistrate judges’ rulings in § 2255 matters heard on consent.358
generally considered to be civil rather than criminal proceedings. See id. at 364 (citing Hilton
v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987)). While magistrate judges have the authority to dispose of
any civil matter with consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), there is no similar statutory consent
provision concerning criminal proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Act besides magistrate
judge authority to dispose of Class A misdemeanor cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(5) and 18
U.S.C. § 3401(b). See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10.
350 Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366.
351 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). See
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37, for an analysis of Schor.
352 Johnston, 258 F.3d at 367.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 368.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 369.
357 Id. at 370.
358 Id. at 371 & n.6.
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In view of these problems, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the consensual
delegation of § 2255 proceedings “exact[s] a deadly blow” to an independent
judiciary and was thus unconstitutional.359 The court reasoned that the delegation to magistrate judges would violate the separation of powers as it would
give Congress “the capability to direct the affairs of Article III courts” through
its legislative powers over “the term, the salary, the qualifications, the duties,
and the establishment of magistrate judges.”360
The court therefore vacated the magistrate judge’s judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings.361 Judge Higginbotham wrote a concurring
opinion, stating that the court did not need to reach the constitutional issue, but
also calling into question the very practice of referring any civil cases to magistrate judges under § 636(c) in an era where the number of trials conducted by
district judges has declined.362
(b) Brown v. United States
Thirteen years after the Johnston decision, the Eleventh Circuit, in Brown
v. United States, held that a federal habeas corpus petition arising under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is not a “civil matter” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and therefore
could not be disposed of by a magistrate judge with the parties’ consent.363 The
court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance in reaching this holding.364
In dicta, however, the court went further to express “serious concerns as to the
facial constitutionality of § 636(c),” particularly whether the civil consent authority of magistrate judges and the petty offense jurisdiction of magistrate
judges under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 violate Article III of the Constitution as exercises of “the judicial Power of the United States” by non-Article III judicial officers.365
In 2005, petitioner James Brown pled guilty in the Southern District of
Florida to “using a computer . . . to knowingly persuade, induce, entice and coerce an individual who had not attained the age of eighteen years, to engage in
sexual activity under circumstances [that] would constitute a criminal offense
. . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”366 As a career offender, he was sentenced to a term of 235 months imprisonment.367 In March 2011, Brown moved
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to have the district court vacate his conviction and sentence.368 In April 2011, both Brown and the government consented to have a
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368

Id. at 372.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 372–73 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1059.
See id. at 1068.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
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magistrate judge dispose of the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).369 In July
2011, the magistrate judge denied Brown’s § 2255 motion for failure to state a
basis for granting relief and later denied Brown’s motion for reconsideration.370
After appealing both rulings to the court of appeals, Brown moved to have the
magistrate judge vacate his order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(4), arguing that, under the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Johnston,371 “the consensual delegation of § 2255 motions to magistrate judges
violates Article III of the Constitution.”372 Although the magistrate judge denied Brown’s motion to vacate, the magistrate judge issued a Certificate of Appealability on this question.373
The court of appeals began its analysis of Brown’s appeal with an exhaustive review of the history of the Federal Magistrates Act and the earlier United
States commissioner system, stating in summary,
[M]agistrate judges (and their predecessors, the commissioners) are not—and
have never purported to be—Article III judges. Instead, magistrate judges “draw
their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I
of the Constitution.” Although Congress considered magistrate judges to be “adjunct[s] of the United States District Court, appointed by the court and subject to
the court’s direction and control,” the fact is that when magistrate judges exercise their authority to try petty offenses and to enter final judgment in civil cases, they are exercising the essential attributes of “judicial Power.” They do not
function as mere adjuncts. They are puisne judges acting as courts. But Article
III is clear . . . . As previously recounted, magistrate judges do not hold lifetenure, nor is their compensation undiminishable. Therefore, these puisne judges
cannot exercise “the judicial Power of the United States.” Thus, a magistrate
judge who exercises final judgment on a § 2255 motion implicates a potentially
serious constitutional problem.374

The court further suggested that earlier decisions directly or indirectly upholding the constitutionality of § 636(c) under Article III, including the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roell,375 and its own recent opinion, Day,376 had been
called into question by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stern.377 The Eleventh
Circuit therefore invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to resolve the
issue, concluding that “although § 636(c) could plausibly be read to authorize a
369

Id.
Id.
371 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001). See supra Section II.B.2.b.i(a) for an analysis of Johnston.
372 Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048–49.
373 Id. at 1049.
374 Id. at 1057–58 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); then
quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 8 (1979); and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
375 Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003). See supra Section II.A.1 for a detailed analysis
of Roell.
376 See Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013); supra Section
II.B.2.a.iii.
377 See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1072. For an analysis of Stern, see infra Section II.C.1.a.
370
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magistrate judge to enter final judgment in a § 2255 proceeding, to avoid Article III concerns we hold that it does not because such a reading is equally plausible.”378 Accordingly, the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does not authorize
magistrate judges to enter final judgments on § 2255 motions because such motions are not “civil matters” under § 636(c).379
Because the Eleventh Circuit panel deliberately avoided making a decision
on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and based its holding on statutory
grounds, the opinion’s lengthy discussion of the panel’s “serious concerns”
about whether aspects of magistrate judge authority violate Article III is dicta.
Nevertheless, the court expressed doubts about the constitutionality of § 636(c)
and even suggested that a magistrate judge’s authority in a petty offense case
under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 may violate Article III.380 The dicta in Brown is a striking reminder that some judges retain doubts about the constitutionality of expanded magistrate judge authority under the Federal Magistrates Act.
ii.

State Habeas Corpus Petitions Under § 2254

Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Johnston, at least two appellate courts
had held that magistrate judges could dispose of state habeas corpus petitions
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with the parties consent.381 After Johnston,
however, there were attempts to apply the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning to argue
that magistrate judges also were not permitted to dispose of habeas corpus matters under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To date, however, courts have rejected these arguments.
For example, in White v. Thaler, the Fifth Circuit held that a magistrate
judge had authority to dispose of a state habeas corpus petition with the consent
of the parties and that this authority did not violate the separation of powers
under Article III.382
After petitioner Wendell White was convicted of murder and aggravated
assault charges in a Texas state court, he filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Southern District of Texas, claiming that his attorney at trial rendered ineffective assistance.383 After White and attorneys for the
State of Texas consented to disposition of the case by a magistrate judge, the
magistrate judge denied White’s petition, concluding that the trial court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable under federal law.384 The magistrate
378

Brown, 748 F.3d at 1072.
Id.
380 See id. at 1057–58. For further discussion of constitutional arguments concerning the authority of magistrate judges to dispose of petty offense cases without the defendant’s consent, see infra Section II.C.2.
381 See Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 326 (6th Cir. 1998); Orsini v. Wallace, 913 F.2d
474, 483 (8th Cir. 1990).
382 White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010).
383 Id. at 892, 894–95.
384 Id. at 895.
379
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judge also granted White’s request for a Certificate of Appealability to the Fifth
Circuit only on the issue “whether counsel was ineffective.”385
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte addressed the issue of “whether the
consensual delegation of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding to a magistrate judge
violates Article III of the Constitution,” noting that it had previously held in
Johnston that the consensual delegation of a proceeding under § 2255 to a magistrate judge for disposition violated Article III.386 The court acknowledged,
however, that it had distinguished between § 2254 and § 2255 matters in Johnston in that a § 2255 motion “questions the validity of a prior federal court ruling,” while a § 2254 proceeding attacks a state court’s judgment.387 After noting that three other circuits had concluded that the consensual delegation of
petitions under § 2254 to magistrate judges under § 636(c) did not violate the
Constitution, the court concluded that, as a § 2254 proceeding does not raise
separation of powers concerns, the consensual delegation of these matters to
magistrate judges did not violate Article III.388
Turning to the merits of the case, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the magistrate judge’s findings, concluding that White was prejudiced by the deficient
performance of his trial attorney.389 It therefore reversed “the district court’s
judgment denying habeas relief” and remanded the case to the district court
“with instructions to grant the writ and require a retrial of White.”390
In a footnote in her opinion dissenting on the merits of the panel’s decision,
then-Chief Judge Edith Jones agreed with the majority’s view that Article III
was not violated when the magistrate judge decided the merits of this case on
consent, but was nevertheless disturbed by that result:
While I concur in the conclusion that Article III of the Constitution was not
violated when the parties consented to proceed in this federal habeas action before a United States Magistrate Judge, this result is somewhat troubling. When
federal courts exercise our habeas corpus jurisdiction to overturn the decisions
of a state’s highest court, we directly interfere with state sovereignty. Article III
judges should assume ultimate responsibility for deciding these consequential
cases, although they may choose to accept a report and recommendation from a
magistrate judge.391

Judge Jones’ view that the use of magistrate judges to dispose of state habeas corpus matters under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with consent is a “troubling” development reflects the unease some judges continue to have with the expansion
of magistrate judge authority.

385
386
387
388
389
390
391

Id.
Id.
Id. at 896.
Id. at 896, 898.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id. at 916 n.2 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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Eight years before White, the Seventh Circuit, in Farmer v. Litscher, also
held that the consensual delegation of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for disposition by a magistrate judge did not violate
Article III.392
Appellants James Farmer and Emmett White were state prisoners who filed
petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.393 The parties consented under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and a
magistrate judge denied both “petitions and refused to issue certificates of appealability.”394 After the prisoners appealed to the Seventh Circuit, the court
asked the parties to brief the issue of whether “a magistrate judge acting with
the parties’ consent ha[d] the authority under § 636(c) to issue a final judgment
in a § 2254 proceeding.”395
The Seventh Circuit noted that answering the question required the court to
consider two issues: (1) whether Congress intended to give magistrate judges
authority to dispose of § 2254 matters on consent; and, if so, (2) whether the
delegation of such authority to magistrate judges violated Article III.396 The
court held that because state habeas corpus matters are considered civil cases in
federal court, magistrate judges can dispose of them under § 636(c).397 The
court rejected the appellants’ argument that § 636(b)(2)(B) limited the reach of
§ 636(c), concluding that the two sections are “independent provisions that address different circumstances.”398 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that Article III does not prohibit magistrate judges from entering final judgments in
§ 2254 proceedings with the consent of the parties.399
c.

“Opt Out” Consent Procedures

As noted elsewhere in this paper, district courts have used a variety of approaches and procedures to encourage parties to consent to the disposition of
civil cases by magistrate judges.400 One of these procedures is the assignment
of a share of civil cases to magistrate judges, rather than district judges, as the
presiding judge in the case. In the mid-1990s, however, several district courts
implemented “opt out” consent procedures, where, after a case was assigned to
a magistrate judge, parties who did not act within a specific time period would
be deemed to have consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate

392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400

Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section II.B.2.a.
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judge.401 “Opt out” consent procedures thus allowed for implied consent by the
parties by interpreting a litigant’s failure to object as acquiescence to disposition of the case by a magistrate judge.402
Beginning in 1994, appellate courts held in several cases that these procedures were impermissible under the Federal Magistrates Act. These cases are
discussed below. The Supreme Court’s decision in Roell, however, holding that
in some situations a litigant’s actions might constitute consent under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), which was analyzed earlier in this paper, once again raises the question of whether “opt out” procedures might once again be feasible in the district
courts.403
The Ninth Circuit ruled in three separate opinions that “opt out” procedures
implemented in the Northern District of California, the District of Idaho, and
the District of Montana violated 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).404 In Nasca, the Ninth Circuit examined an “opt out” consent procedure adopted by local rule in the
Northern District of California, whereby parties were deemed to have consented to disposition of their civil case by the magistrate judge if they did not object
to the assignment within a set period of time.405 The court held that the magistrate judge did not have proper jurisdiction over the case.
The case began “as a divorce proceeding in California Superior Court.”406
After the husband joined his pension plan, Peoplesoft, as a defendant in the action, Peoplesoft removed the case to the Northern District of California under
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).407 The
magistrate judge assigned to the case remanded it to state court and ordered
Peoplesoft to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.408 Peoplesoft appealed these
orders to the Ninth Circuit, which raised sua sponte the issue of the magistrate
judge’s authority to hear the case.409
Restating the reasoning it expressed previously in its Aldrich decision,410
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction to hear
the case without the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b).411 The court stated that consent “must be explicit, clear, unambiguous, and cannot be inferred from the conduct of the parties,
401

See, e.g., Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by Wilhelm
v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012).
402 See id.
403 See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003); supra Section II.A.1.
404 See Nasca, 160 F.3d 578 (Northern District of California); Aldrich v. Bowen, 130 F.3d
1364 (9th Cir. 1997) (District of Idaho); Laird v. Chisholm, 85 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (District of Montana).
405 Nasca, 160 F.3d at 579.
406 Id. at 578.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 578–79.
410 See Aldrich, 130 F.3d at1365.
411 Nasca, 160 F.3d at 580.
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general orders by the district court to the contrary notwithstanding.”412 It held
that the general order adopted by the Northern District of California, which
provides for “consent by failure to object” to the assignment of the case to a
magistrate judge, did not constitute adequate consent under the Federal Magistrates Act.413 Noting that magistrate judge authority is “strictly circumscribed
by statute,” the court concluded that “courts, whether by general order or otherwise, are not at liberty to disregard or modify the statutory prerequisites to a
magistrate[ judge]’s jurisdiction.”414 Because the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction to enter the remand order or the award of attorney’s fees, the appellate
court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.415 It therefore
dismissed the appeal.416
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions involving “opt out”
procedures in the Southern District of Alabama.417 In Rembert v. Apfel, the
Eleventh Circuit held that a magistrate judge presiding in a social security appeal assigned under an “opt out” consent procedure lacked authority to render a
judgment and therefore the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider
the appeal.418
Plaintiff Rachel Rembert filed a complaint in the Southern District of Alabama contesting the denial of supplemental security income benefits.419 Under
a standing order of the court, the case was automatically assigned to a magistrate judge and the parties were notified that unless they requested reassignment
to a district judge by returning a form within thirty days, the parties would be
deemed to have consented.420 Neither party filed the form and the magistrate
judge then entered a final judgment against Rembert.421 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit “sua sponte asked the parties to address whether they had consented the magistrate[ judge]’s authority, [rendering the] . . . judgment final and
appealable.”422
Citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nasca, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that consent to disposition by a magistrate judge through the
district’s “opt out” standing order was not proper.423 Noting that Rembert, “did
nothing, either before or after judgment, to indicate her express consent to final
disposition of her case before a magistrate judge,” the court treated the magis412

Id.
Id. at 579.
414 Id. at 579–80.
415 Id. at 580.
416 Id.
417 See McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Rembert v. Apfel, 213
F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
418 Rembert, 213 F.3d at 1335.
419 Id. at 1333.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 1334–35 (citing Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578, 578 (9th Cir. 1998)).
413
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trate judge’s order as “in essence . . . a nonfinal, nonappealable report and recommendation not yet adopted by the district court.”424 It therefore dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.425
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Roell v. Withrow, holding that consent to
disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) may
be inferred in certain situations from a party’s conduct during litigation, has
cast doubt on the reasoning applied in Nasca, Rembert, and other decisions.426
To the extent that these pre-Roell decisions held that consent under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) must be express and on the record, later decisions by both the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits have acknowledged that Roell clearly abrogated the reasoning in those opinions.427 While no court has formally enacted local rules or
standing orders reviving “opt out” consent procedures after Roell, some magistrate judges have expressed the view in unpublished opinions that parties, by
failing to make timely responses to consent deadlines, have opted to consent to
disposition of their case by the magistrate judge.428
C. Remaining Issues Under Article III of the Constitution
1. Does Civil Consent Authority Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) Violate Article
III of the Constitution?
As noted earlier, the question of whether the civil consent authority of
magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violates Article III of the Constitution had not been seriously considered by courts since the numerous circuit
court opinions issued in the early 1980s.429 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has never directly addressed the question of whether § 636(c) violates Article
III. In the early 1980s, however, every court of appeals that had considered the
question concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not violate Article III.430 Apart
424

Id.
Id.
426 See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003); supra Section II.A.
427 See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To the extent that we
have previously held that we can never infer consent, we have been overruled by the Supreme Court in Roell.” (citing Nasca, 160 F.3d 578)); Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the reasoning in Rembert has been abrogated by Roell).
428 See, e.g., Little Bend River Co. v. Molpus Timberlands Mgmt., L.L.C., No. CA 05-0450C, 2005 WL 2897400, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2005) (citing Roell and holding that the
parties had implicitly consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction under § 636(c) by failing to object to the referral of the case to a magistrate judge within the time period provided
under the district’s consent procedure); Alicea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-1967 (CVR),
2011 WL 4753451, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct. 5, 2011).
429 See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 31–36.
430 See Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Va.
Dept. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma
Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding an appeal that challenged the
constitutionality of § 636(c) “abusive of the judicial process” and grounds for an award of
425
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from the Fifth Circuit’s 2001 decision in Johnston, holding that the consensual
disposition of a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a
magistrate judge under § 636(c) violated Article III,431 it appeared that this issue was well settled.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern v. Marshall, however, revived questions about the extent that non-Article III judges could handle state common
law claims without violating the Constitution. Although Stern involved the authority of bankruptcy judges (and the Court’s majority opinion never mentioned
magistrate judges), much of the majority opinion’s language appeared to implicate the authority of magistrate judges, particularly in consent cases.432
a. Stern v. Marshall
In Stern, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that a final
judgment issued by a bankruptcy judge on a state law tort counterclaim, defined as a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C),433 violated the
separation of powers principles set forth in Article III of the Constitution.434
attorney’s fees against the party raising the issue); Fields v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742
F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp.,
739 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704–05 (11th
Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729
F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix,
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721
F.2d 922, 923 (3d Cir. 1983); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 41–53
(analyzing Pacemaker, Wharton-Thomas, Collins, and Geras).
431 See supra Section II.B.2.b.i(a) for a detailed analysis of the Johnston case.
432 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
433 As the Supreme Court described in its Wellness decision,
[D]istrict courts have original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and related proceedings. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), (b). But “[e]ach district court may provide that any or all” bankruptcy cases
and related proceedings “shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” § 157(a).
Bankruptcy judges are “judicial officers of the United States district court,” appointed to 14–
year terms by the courts of appeals, and subject to removal for cause. §§ 152(a)(1), (e). “The district court may withdraw” a reference to the bankruptcy court “on its own motion or on timely
motion of any party, for cause shown.” § 157(d).
When a district court refers a case to a bankruptcy judge, that judge’s statutory authority depends on whether Congress has classified the matter as a “[c]ore proceedin[g]” or a “[n]on-core
proceedin[g],” §§ 157(b)(2), (4) . . . . Congress identified as “[c]ore” a nonexclusive list of 16
types of proceedings, § 157(b)(2), in which it thought bankruptcy courts could constitutionally
enter judgment. Congress gave bankruptcy courts the power to “hear and determine” core proceedings and to “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” subject to appellate review by the district court. § 157(b)(1); see § 158. But it gave bankruptcy courts more limited authority in noncore proceedings: They may “hear and determine” such proceedings, and “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” only “with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding.” § 157(c)(2).
Absent consent, bankruptcy courts in non-core proceedings may only “submit proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law,” which the district courts review de novo. § 157(c)(1).

Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939–40 (2015) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
434 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01; see Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1959–60.
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The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Roberts, in which Justices
Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia issued a concurring
opinion. Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg,
Kagan, and Sotomayor joined.
i.

Case Summary

The case arose from the well-publicized and convoluted legal dispute between the estates of Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie, more famously known as
Anna Nicole Smith) and E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce) over the fortune of J.
Howard Marshall (J. Howard), Vickie’s deceased husband and Pierce’s father.435
Before J. Howard passed away, Vickie filed suit in Texas state probate court, asserting that Pierce . . . fraudulently induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that
did not include her, even though J. Howard meant to give her half his property.
....
After J. Howard’s death, Vickie filed a bankruptcy petition in the Central
District of California. Pierce filed a complaint in that bankruptcy proceeding,
contending that Vickie had defamed him by inducing her lawyers to tell members of the press that he had engaged in fraud to gain control of his father’s assets. The complaint sought a declaration that Pierce’s defamation claim was not
dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings. Pierce subsequently filed a proof
of claim for the defamation action, . . . [seeking] to recover damages . . . from
Vickie’s bankruptcy estate. Vickie responded to Pierce’s initial complaint by asserting truth as a defense to the alleged defamation and by filing a counterclaim
for tortious interference with the gift she expected from J. Howard. 436

In 1999, “the Bankruptcy Court issued an order granting Vickie summary
judgment on Pierce’s claim for defamation.”437 In making its decision, the
bankruptcy court determined an issue of Texas state law that had not yet been
addressed by the Texas Supreme Court.438
[A]fter a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court issued a judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim in her favor, . . . [and] awarded Vickie over $400 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.
In post-trial proceedings, Pierce argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked
jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim. In particular, Pierce renewed a claim he
had made earlier in the litigation, asserting that the Bankruptcy Court’s authority
over the counterclaim was limited because Vickie’s counterclaim was not a
“core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).439

435
436
437
438
439

See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The bankruptcy court disagreed, “conclud[ing] that Vickie’s counterclaim was
‘a core proceeding’ under § 157(b)(2)(C),” and that it “had the ‘power to enter
judgment’ on the counterclaim under § 157(b)(1).”440
On appeal, the district court “concluded that a ‘counterclaim should not be
characterized as core’ when it ‘is only somewhat related to the claim against
which it is asserted, and when the unique characteristics and context of the
counterclaim place it outside of the normal type of set-off or other counterclaims that customarily arise.’ ”441 Further,
the court determined that it was required to treat the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment as “proposed[,] rather than final,” and engage in an “independent review”
of the record. Although the Texas state court had by that time conducted a jury
trial on the merits of the parties’ dispute and entered a judgment in Pierce’s favor, the District Court declined to give that judgment preclusive effect and went
on to decide the matter itself. Like the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court
found that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy of a gift
from J. Howard, . . . and awarded Vickie compensatory and punitive damages,
each in the amount of $44,292,767.33.442

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed the district court on different grounds, and the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit
on that issue.443 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit
held that § 157 mandated “a two-step approach” under which a bankruptcy
judge may issue a final judgment in a proceeding only if the matter both “meets
Congress’ definition of a core proceeding and arises under or arises in title 11
. . . .” The court also reasoned that allowing a bankruptcy judge to enter final
judgments on all counterclaims raised in bankruptcy proceedings “would certainly run afoul” of [the Supreme] Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline.444

The court therefore
concluded that “a counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C) is properly a ‘core’ proceeding ‘arising in a case under’ the [Bankruptcy] Code only if the counterclaim
is so closely related to [a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the
counterclaim is necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim
itself.”445

Under this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Vickie’s counterclaim
did not constitute a “core” proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(C).446 The judgment
of the Texas probate court was thus “the earliest final judgment entered ‘on
440

Id. at 2602.
Id. (quoting Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 632 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
442 Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Marshall, 264 B.R. at
633).
443 Id. (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314–15 (2006); Marshall v. Marshall (In
re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004)).
444 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1057
(9th Cir. 2010)).
445 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1058).
446 Id.
441
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matters relevant to this proceeding.’ ”447 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit “concluded that the District Court should have ‘afford[ed] preclusive effect’ to the Texas
‘court’s determination of relevant legal and factual issues.’ ”448 The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari.449
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts initially ruled that “Vickie’s
counterclaim against Pierce for tortious interference [was] in fact a ‘core proceeding’ under the plain text of § 157(b)(2)(C).”450 Nevertheless, he further
concluded that while “§ 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does
not.”451
The majority noted that the Court had long recognized a “public rights” exception to the requirements of Article III,452 first articulated in Murray’s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.453 The Supreme Court has explained that
“the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when
Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of
encroaching on the judicial powers” [set forth in Article III] is less than when
private rights, which are normally within the purview of the judiciary, are relegated as an initial matter to administrative adjudication.454

Emphasizing the Court’s earlier analysis of bankruptcy courts under the
“public rights” exception in Northern Pipeline,455 Chief Justice Roberts stated:
It is clear that the Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the “judicial Power of
the United States” in purporting to resolve and enter final judgment on a state
common law claim, just as the court did in Northern Pipeline. No “public right”
exception excuses the failure to comply with Article III in doing so, any more
than in Northern Pipeline.456

447

Id. (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65).
Id. at 2602–03 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65).
449 Id. at 2603.
450 Id. at 2604.
451 Id. at 2608.
452 Id. at 2611.
453 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
454 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853–54 (1986) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985)).
455 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69–70 (1982). In Northern Pipeline, a majority of the Supreme Court declared that the portion of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 that conferred Article III powers on bankruptcy judges without the protections of life tenure and irreducible salaries violated Article III of the Constitution. In particular, Justice Brennan defined the “public rights” doctrine as, “matters of public right [that]
must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others’ . . . our precedents clearly
establish that only [such] controversies . . . may be removed from Art. III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination.” Id. For a detailed
analysis of Northern Pipeline, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 23–30.
456 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.
448
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The majority therefore concluded that “Vickie’s counterclaim cannot be
deemed a matter of ‘public right’ that can be decided outside the Judicial
Branch,” and her counterclaim did not “fall within any of the varied formulations of the public rights exception in this Court’s cases.”457 After discussing
several Supreme Court decisions that analyzed the authority of particular nonArticle III tribunals under Article III, including Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,458 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,459
and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,460 Chief Justice Roberts summarized the
Court’s Article III analysis:
What is plain here is that this case involves the most prototypical exercise
of judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court with broad
substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory regime. If such an
exercise of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by deeming it part of some amorphous “public right,” then Article III
would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of
powers we have long recognized into mere wishful thinking.461

The Court further rejected Vickie’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s
final judgment was constitutional because bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 were deemed “adjuncts” of the district courts, stating that “a
bankruptcy court can no more be deemed a mere ‘adjunct’ of the district court
than a district court can be deemed such an ‘adjunct’ of the court of appeals.”462
It also noted that its Article III analysis was not affected by the fact that judges
of an Article III court, rather than the President, appoint that bankruptcy judges,
concluding: “If . . . the bankruptcy court itself exercises ‘the essential attributes
of judicial power [that] are reserved to Article III courts,’ it does not matter
who appointed the bankruptcy judge or authorized the judge to render final
judgments in such proceedings. The constitutional bar remains.”463
The majority concluded by summarizing its holding:
Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United
States may be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth
in that Article. We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984. The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of
claim.464

The Court therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464

Id. at 2611, 2614.
Thomas, 473 U.S. 568.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833.
492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615.
Id. at 2619.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851).
Id. at 2620.
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Potential Application of Stern Reasoning to Magistrate Judge
Authority

The majority’s ruling in Stern applied only to the “core” jurisdiction of
bankruptcy judges under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). Chief Justice Roberts described the Court’s holding as applying only in “one isolated respect” where
Congress exceeded the limitations of Article III in the Bankruptcy Act of
1984.465 As noted above, magistrate judges were not mentioned in the majority
or concurring opinions, and were only mentioned in passing in Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion.466 Nevertheless, the Stern majority’s analysis of Article III
arguably could be applied to limit the authority of magistrate judges.
Prior to Stern, analysis of whether expansions of magistrate judge authority
implicated separation of powers concerns under Article III had focused on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Peretz.467 As noted earlier, the Court stated in
Peretz that a defendant’s right to have an Article III judge adjudicate certain
proceedings in a felony case (in that case, voir dire) could be waived by the defendant, and that referring such duties to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3) did not violate Article III of the Constitution.468 In particular, the
Court adapted its Article III analysis of the Federal Magistrates Act in Peretz
from the analysis set forth in Schor.469
In Peretz and Schor, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part analysis to determine whether a statutory scheme granting judicial duties to non-Article III
judicial officers violates Article III of the Constitution.470 Under that analysis,
Article III protects two sets of values: (1) an individual’s right to have a claim
adjudicated by an Article III judge, and (2) the court’s “structural” interest in
maintaining an independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.471 A statute must adequately protect both values to survive
scrutiny under the Court’s Article III analysis.
The continuing validity of the constitutional analysis set forth in Peretz and
Schor was called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. Although the majority in Stern cited the Court’s earlier opinion in Schor as one of
several Supreme Court opinions analyzing Article III challenges to non-Article
III tribunals since the Northern Pipeline decision, it did not emphasize the sev-

465

Id.
See id. at 2627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough Congress technically exercised its
Article I power when it created bankruptcy courts, functionally, bankruptcy judges can be
compared to magistrate judges, law clerks, and the Judiciary’s administrative officials,
whose lack of Article III tenure and compensation protections do not endanger the independence of the Judicial Branch.”).
467 See supra Part I.C.
468 See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935–39 (1991).
469 See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 18.
470 See id.
471 Id.
466
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eral factors of the balancing test set forth in Schor in its analysis.472 Instead, the
majority explicitly reasserted the narrower interpretation of the “public rights”
exception to Article III originally stated in Northern Pipeline to conclude that a
bankruptcy judge, as a non-Article III judicial officer, did not have authority to
rule on the state law counterclaim at issue in the case.473 It was therefore unclear whether the balancing test in Schor, previously applied by the Court in
Peretz and Gonzalez, would still be used by the Court in the future.
A significant question left unresolved by the Court in Stern was whether
litigant consent to the authority of a bankruptcy judge in a state common law
claim might satisfy Article III concerns. Chief Justice Roberts noted that
Pierce’s failure to consent to having the bankruptcy court resolve Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim was one factor in concluding that the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction violated Article III: “Pierce did not truly consent to resolution of Vickie’s claim in the bankruptcy court proceedings. He
had nowhere else to go if he wished to recover from Vickie’s estate.”474 In the
footnote following this assertion, the majority emphasized this point:
Contrary to the claims of the dissent, Pierce did not have another forum in
which to pursue his claim to recover from Vickie’s prebankruptcy assets, rather
than take his chances with whatever funds might remain after the Title 11 proceedings. . . . That is why, as we recognized in Granfinanciera, the notion of
“consent” does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in other contexts.475

At the time that the Court issued the Stern opinion, it remained to be seen
whether litigant consent to disposition of a case by a magistrate judge under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) would constitute one of the “other contexts” suggested in footnote eight that would satisfy Article III concerns under this reasoning. Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the issue of whether
§ 636(c) violated Article III under the reasoning in Stern three months after the
decision was issued.476 That court, however, ultimately held that it was bound
by its earlier precedent holding that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not violate the Constitution.477 Uncertainties about the constitutionality of § 636(c), however, ap-

472

See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613–15 (2011).
Id. at 2614–15.
474 Id. at 2614.
475 Id. at 2615 n.8 (citation omitted).
476 See Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 401 (5th
Cir. 2012). On September 9, 2011, a panel of the Fifth Circuit sua sponte ordered the parties
in an appeal of a civil case disposed of by a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Texas to submit letter briefs addressing whether the reasoning in Stern applied to magistrate
judges. In particular, the Fifth Circuit requested briefing on whether, under Stern, a magistrate judge can enter a final judgment in a case tried to a magistrate judge by consent under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and state law provides the rule of decision. Id.
477 See id. at 405 (citing Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984)).
473
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pear to have been removed by the Court’s 2015 decision in Wellness International Network v. Sharif.478
b. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif
On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wellness. In a
six to three decision written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that Article
III of the Constitution “is not violated when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court.”479
i.

Case Summary

The case arose from a litigant’s repeated attempts to enforce a judgment.480
Petitioner Wellness, a manufacturer of health and nutrition products, entered
into an agreement with respondent Richard Sharif whereby Sharif would distribute Wellness products.481 After the business arrangement soured, Sharif
sued Wellness in the Northern District of Texas.482 “Sharif repeatedly ignored
Wellness’ discovery requests and other litigation obligations,” so the court entered default judgment and imposed sanctions against Sharif in the amount of
$650,000.483 In February 2009, Sharif filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in
the Northern District of Illinois, listing Wellness as a creditor.484 When Wellness discovered that Sharif had listed more than $5 million in assets on a 2002
loan application, Sharif responded that the assets were controlled by the Soad
Wattar Living Trust (Trust), an entity he administered on behalf of his mother
and for his sister’s benefit.485 When Sharif failed to respond to requests for information about the Trust, “Wellness filed a five-count adversary complaint
against Sharif in the Bankruptcy Court.”486 The first four counts of the complaint objected to the discharge of Sharif’s debts on the grounds that he “had
concealed property by claiming that it was owned by the Trust.”487 In the fifth
count of the complaint, Wellness sought a declaratory judgment that the Trust
was in fact Sharif’s alter ego and its assets should be included as part of the
bankruptcy estate.488 In his answer to the complaint, Sharif conceded that the
adversary proceeding was a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) over

478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488

See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948 (2015).
Id. at 1939.
Id. at 1940.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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which the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, and requested a judgment in his
favor on all counts.489
After Sharif again refused to respond to discovery requests, Wellness
moved to compel discovery and for sanctions.490 Although the bankruptcy court
warned Sharif that a default judgment might be entered against him if he did
not comply with the court’s orders compelling discovery, Sharif failed to produce any documents regarding the Trust.491 The bankruptcy court subsequently
ruled that Sharif had violated the court’s discovery order, “denied Sharif’s request to discharge his debts and entered a default judgment against him in the
adversary proceeding.”492 In particular, the bankruptcy court ruled that the
Trust’s assets at issue in the fifth count of the complaint were in fact the property of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate.493
Sharif appealed the bankruptcy court’s rulings to the district court.494 Six
weeks before Sharif filed his opening brief, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Stern.495 “Sharif did not cite Stern in his opening brief. Rather, after the
close of briefing, Sharif moved for leave to file a supplemental brief,” arguing
that under Stern and In re Ortiz, the bankruptcy court’s ruling should be treated
as a report and recommendation by the district court.496 After the district court
denied Sharif’s motion as untimely and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, Sharif appealed to the Seventh Circuit.497
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While acknowledging that Sharif’s Stern claim was untimely, the court held that it must nonetheless consider the claim because it “concerned ‘the allocation of authority between bankruptcy courts and district courts’ under Article III” of the
Constitution.498 It therefore concluded “that ‘a litigant may not waive’ a Stern
objection.”499 As to the merits of the claim, the court agreed that the bankruptcy
court had properly resolved the first four counts in Wellness’s adversary complaint.500 It further held, however, that the fifth count of the complaint (reassigning the Trust’s assets to Sharif’s bankruptcy estate) alleged a Stern claim,
and that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter a final

489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500

Id. at 1941.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir. 2011).
Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1941.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judgment on that claim.501 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.502
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor stated: “This case presents the
question whether Article III allows bankruptcy judges to adjudicate [Stern
claims] with the parties’ consent. We hold that Article III is not violated when
the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy
judge.”503
The majority relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in three cases: Schor,504 Gomez,505 and Peretz.506 Applying the reasoning in these three
cases to the case at bar, the majority stated:
The question here, then, is whether allowing bankruptcy courts to decide
Stern claims by consent would “impermissibly threate[n] the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.” And that question must be decided not by “formalistic and unbending rules,” but “with an eye to the practical effect that the” practice “will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.” The
Court must weigh
the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved
to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article
III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.507

In its application of the Schor and Peretz factors, the majority determined
that parties in bankruptcy cases could waive their rights to adjudication of Stern
claims by an Article III judge without undermining the basic constitutional authority of Article III courts.508 In particular, it noted that “[b]ankruptcy judges,
like magistrate judges, ‘are appointed and subject to removal by Article III
judges,’ . . . ‘serve as judicial officers of the United States district court,’ and
collectively ‘constitute a unit of the district court’ for that district.”509 Moreo501

Id. at 1941–42.
Id. at 1942.
503 Id. at 1939.
504 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834–35 (1986) (holding
that a litigant’s consent to have claims disposed of by a non-Article III tribunal did not violate Article III and was at most a “de minimis” infringement of the prerogatives of the federal court); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37.
505 Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (holding that a magistrate judge could not
conduct voir dire in a felony case as an additional duty under § 636(b)(3) if the defendant
objected to the magistrate judge’s involvement); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 21, at 12–14.
506 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 21, at 16–21.
507 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Schor, 478
U.S. at 851).
508 Id. at 1944–45.
509 Id. at 1945 (citations omitted).
502
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ver, just as in Peretz the majority noted that the district court made the overriding decision to refer a matter to a magistrate judge in the first place, the Court
here observed that bankruptcy courts only hear bankruptcy matters because district courts refer those cases to them, and that the district court retains the authority to withdraw such references sua sponte or at the request of a party under
28 U.S.C. § 157(d).510 The majority therefore concluded, “ ‘[S]eparation of
powers concerns are diminished’ when, as here, ‘the decision to invoke [a nonArticle III] forum is left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction’ remains intact.”511
The majority further observed there was “no indication that Congress gave
bankruptcy courts the ability to decide Stern claims in an effort to aggrandize
itself or humble the Judiciary.”512 Quoting language from the Peretz decision,
the Court stated that “[b]ecause the entire process takes place under the district
court’s total control and jurisdiction, there is no danger that use of the [bankruptcy court] involves a congressional attemp[t] to transfer jurisdiction to [nonArticle III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”513
The majority rejected an expansive reading of the Court’s Stern decision,
stating that Stern “turned on the fact that the litigant ‘did not truly consent to’
resolution of the claim against it in a non-Article III forum.”514 The Court further reasoned that “[b]ecause Stern was premised on nonconsent to adjudication
by the Bankruptcy Court, the ‘constitutional bar’ it announced simply does not
govern the question whether litigants may validly consent to adjudication by a
bankruptcy court.”515
The majority summarized the governing Supreme Court decisions on litigant consent to disposition of claims by a non-Article III tribunal:
In sum, the cases in which this Court has found a violation of a litigant’s
right to an Article III decisionmaker have involved an objecting defendant
forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article III court. The Court has never done what Sharif and the principal dissent would have us do—hold that a litigant who has the right to an Article III court may not waive that right through
his consent.516

Noting Chief Justice Roberts’ strong dissent to the majority’s interpretation
of Stern, the majority stated:
The principal dissent warns darkly of the consequences of today’s decision.
To hear the principal dissent tell it, the world will end not in fire, or ice, but in a
bankruptcy court. . . .

510
511
512
513
514
515
516

Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 855).
Id.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991)).
Id. at 1946 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1947.
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Adjudication based on litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the
federal court system since its inception. Reaffirming that unremarkable fact, we
are confident, poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights, constitutional or otherwise.517

The majority finally held that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy
court need not be express. Relying squarely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Roell,518 the majority concluded that the implied consent of the parties was
sufficient to provide the bankruptcy court with authority to dispose of a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 157, provided the consent was also “knowing and voluntary.”519 After determining that the lower court record was insufficient to decide whether the implied consent of Sharif was knowing and voluntary, the majority reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for
further proceedings.520
ii.

Significance of Wellness for Magistrate Judge Authority

Although the majority opinion in Wellness is of particular importance to
bankruptcy judges, the decision has constitutional significance for magistrate
judges. Notably, the majority opinion relies on the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Peretz,521 thereby reaffirming the Court’s view that the consent of parties
may overcome constitutional concerns when certain matters are referred to
magistrate judges. Moreover, the majority relied heavily on the Court’s reasoning in Roell when it held that knowing and voluntary consent to disposition of
Stern claims by a bankruptcy judge may be implied by the litigants’ conduct.522
The majority opinion in Wellness thus clearly reaffirms that the reasoning set
forth in Peretz and Roell remain the governing standards for evaluating whether
the referral of particular matters to magistrate judges comply with the strictures
of Article III.523
It is also significant that the Court acknowledged, in a footnote, that
“[c]onsistent with our precedents, the Courts of Appeals have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of § 636(c).”524 This footnote is the closest the Supreme Court has come to an express declaration that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does
not violate Article III.

517

Id.
Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003).
519 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948.
520 Id. at 1949.
521 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
522 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948.
523 See, e.g., United States v. Underwood, 597 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying the reasoning in Roell and holding a defendant’s consent to have a magistrate judge conduct a
guilty plea proceeding in a felony case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)
could be inferred from the defendant’s conduct when he failed to object to the magistrate
judge conducting the plea colloquy).
524 Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948 n.12. (emphasis added).
518
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After Wellness, the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to dispose of civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) under Article III appears
to be secure. With every circuit court to have considered the issue agreeing that
§ 636(c) is constitutional,525 it appears unlikely that there will be a circuit split
on the issue that would bring it before the Supreme Court for ultimate resolution.526
Nevertheless, there remain at least two areas of magistrate judge authority
under the Federal Magistrates Act where the constitutionality of particular provisions of the Act remains untested.
2. Does the Authority of Magistrate Judges to Dispose of Petty Offense
Cases Without the Consent of the Defendant Under 18 U.S.C. § 3401
Violate Article III?
In 2000, Congress removed completely the requirement that defendants
must consent to have magistrate judges dispose of petty offense cases.527
Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) expanded magistrate judges’ authority “to try all petty offense cases without [a] defendant’s
consent.”528 However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 left unchanged “the requirement that a defendant must consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction to dispose of a Class A misdemeanor.”529
The constitutional argument for eliminating consent in petty offense cases
was based primarily on the common law reasoning used to explain why defendants charged with petty offenses do not have a right to a jury trial. It has
long been argued that because petty offense cases were not recognized as
“crimes” at the common law, fewer constitutional protections, such as trial by
jury and adjudication by an Article III judge, were required.530 Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Corcoran, in a widely cited law review article published in
1926, set forth an exhaustive history of the common law of England and the
American colonies prior to the American Revolution and concluded that no
right to trial by jury was recognized for minor offenses and therefore federal
petty offense cases also did not require jury trials.531 At least two older Su525

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
But see Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) (raising in dicta
“serious concerns” about the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)); supra Section
II.B.2.b.i(b).
527 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 203(b), 114 Stat.
2410, 2414.
528 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401(b) (2012).
529 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95.
530 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 18 (1979); Federal Magistrate Act: Hearing on S. 3475
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Congress 246–56 (1966) (memorandum of subcomm. staff).
531 See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926).
526
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preme Court cases followed this reasoning to conclude that petty offense cases
in federal courts did not constitute “crimes” under the common law and thus
did not mandate jury trials.532
In addition, another law review article published in 1959, co-written by an
assistant Attorney General of the United States, suggested that non-Article III
magistrate judges should be authorized by Congress specifically to handle minor federal offenses in order to relieve Article III judges from the burden of
disposing such cases.533 The authors argued that the disposition of petty offenses by non-Article III judicial officers would not violate Article III:
An analysis of this constitutional objection to the proposed commissioners’
petty offense jurisdiction indicates that it does not constitute a barrier to the accomplishment of this salutary step. The historical background of the “good behavior” provision supports such a distinct treatment of petty offenses, and review upon appeal to the district courts would provide for a sufficient exercise of
judicial power to satisfy article III. 534

Interestingly, the authors did not discuss any need for the defendant to consent to the jurisdiction of United States commissioners or proposed federal
magistrate judges as part of their constitutional analysis. They concluded that
the petty offense defendant’s right to appeal the judgment of the non-Article III
judge to an Article III judge would be sufficient to ensure the constitutionality
of their proposal:
Summary proceedings by subordinate magistrates have traditionally characterized petty offense trials. The provision of life tenure for the judiciary in the regular courts of record, embodied in article III of the Constitution, carries an implicit exception for inferior tribunals which try minor crimes. And any possible
demand of article III is satisfied by provision of review. It may be concluded
that there are no substantial obstacles to the creation of federal petty offense tribunals or the endowment of United States commissioners with such authority. 535

The subsequent legislative history of the 1996 amendment also concluded
that there was no constitutional impediment to eliminating defendants’ consent
in petty offense cases.536
Until recently, the constitutionality of a magistrate judge’s authority to dispose of petty offense cases without the defendant’s consent had not been seriously questioned or analyzed in the federal courts.537 A 2015 Fifth Circuit case,
532

See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1930); Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1899).
533 See George Cochran Doub & Lionel Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of
Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 443 (1959).
534 Id. at 456.
535 Id. at 467.
536 See S. REP. NO. 104-366, at 28 (1996).
537 The most thorough analysis of the constitutionality of the amended provisions of 28
U.S.C.§ 636(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) was by a magistrate judge in United States v.
McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1996), which provided an in-depth review of the
constitutional arguments concerning magistrate judges’ petty offense authority and conclud-
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however, raises questions about whether this authority might violate Article III
under certain circumstances.
In United States v. Hollingsworth, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a petty offense defendant did not have a constitutional right to a
trial before an Article III judge where the offense took place on a federal enclave and the magistrate judge acted as an Article I judge pursuant to Congress’
authority to create territorial judges under Clause 17 of Article I of the Constitution.538 In a strongly worded dissent, however, another member of the panel
argued that magistrate judges, as adjuncts to Article III judges, do not have the
authority to try, convict, or sentence a petty offense defendant without violating
Article III of the Constitution, unless the defendant consents to the magistrate
judge’s jurisdiction.539
Defendant David Hollingsworth was charged in the Eastern District of
Louisiana with a petty offense assault that occurred at a naval facility in Belle
Chasse, Louisiana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), a federal criminal
statute that applies only “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.”540 While the defendant filed an objection to having the
case tried by a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge concluded that she had
authority under the Federal Magistrates Act to preside over the trial without
Hollingsworth’s consent.541 After a bench trial before the magistrate judge,
Hollingsworth was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment.542 After being convicted before the magistrate judge, the defendant appealed to the
district court, raising a new argument that he had a right to a jury trial in his
case.543 The district judge, however, rejected this argument and affirmed the
magistrate judge’s conviction and sentence.544 Hollingsworth then appealed to
the Fifth Circuit, arguing “for the first time that he ha[d] a constitutional right
to trial before an Art. III judge.”545
Writing for a majority of the panel, Judge Clement rejected Hollingsworth’s argument. The court began with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Palmore v. United States, where the Court held that “Congress was not required
to provide an Art. III court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws
ed “that 18 U.S.C. § 3401 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) are well within constitutional bounds.”
McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. at 1155. In two more recent cases where defendants challenged
the magistrate judge’s authority to try their petty offense cases with consent, the courts simply held that the magistrate judges had proper authority without providing in-depth constitutional analysis. See United States v. Zenón-Encarnación, 387 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2004);
United States v. Rivera-Negron, 201 F.R.D. 285, 287 (D.P.R. 2001).
538 United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2015).
539 Id. at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting).
540 Id. at 558 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012)).
541 Id.
542 Id. at 557–58.
543 Id. at 558.
544 Id.
545 Id. at 558–59.
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applicable only within the District of Columbia.”546 Noting that the defendant
was tried for violating 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), which applies only “within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the court concluded that “under Palmore, Hollingsworth has no constitutional right to trial
before an Art. III court.”547 The court further rejected the defendant’s argument
that magistrate judges are not members of a territorial court created by Congress under Clause 17 of Article I, noting that Hollingsworth did not cite any
section of the Constitution that Congress presumably violated when it authorized federal magistrate judges to conduct trials in misdemeanor cases.548 The
court further observed that under Clause 17, “Congress could have referred all
trials for crimes committed at Belle Chasse to an Article I judge, including felony trials. But Congress chose to refer only trials for petty offenses to federal
magistrate judges.”549 The court finally stated that although it was not certain
from the constitutional text that the defendant was guaranteed even the right to
appeal to an Article III court, Congress had in fact provided Hollingsworth the
right to appeal to two Article III courts under the current statutory scheme.550
The court therefore held that “Hollingsworth did not have a right to trial
before an Art. III judge, and that his trial, conviction, and sentence before a
federal magistrate judge was constitutional.”551 It applied its holding, however,
“only to defendants tried for petty offenses committed on federal enclaves obtained by Congress pursuant to Clause 17.”552
Turning to address arguments raised in the dissenting opinion, the majority
court further observed that historically Congress had “referred trials for misdemeanors committed on certain federal lands” to United States commissioners
without the defendant’s consent.553 The court further noted that it had found no
case where a defendant in a petty offense case before a United States commissioner had ever challenged the constitutionality the commissioner’s authority:
“The fact that these statutes survived unchallenged for more than half a century
ought to inform our constitutional analysis.”554
Further comparing magistrate judges to judges on legislative courts created
by Congress under Clause 17 of Article I, the majority concluded,
Magistrate judges have the professional competence and resources found in the
legislative courts. We discern no meaningful difference between the federal
magistracy and the legislative courts. Indeed, because the federal magistracy’s
members are appointed by federal judges instead of the President or the Presi546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554

Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973).
Hollingsworth, 785 F.3d at 559.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 559–60.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 561.

LEE - 16 NEV. L.J. 845 - FINAL

Summer 2016] “NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE”

6/20/2016 5:57 PM

917

dent’s appointees, we can have greater confidence in federal magistrate judges’
ability to fairly exercise federal judicial power and to avoid diminution of the
separation of powers.555

Finally, after further holding that Hollingsworth had no right to a jury trial,
the court affirmed the district court’s judgment.
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Higginson argued that magistrate judges are “adjuncts” to the Article III courts and therefore cannot render final decisions on matters without the parties’ consent:
Finding constitutional birthright in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18’s “other
powers” phrase―instead of Clause 17’s Seat of Government Clause or its Enclave Clause enhancement of Article I powers―enhances Article III courts’ discretion to refer matters to the federal magistracy for preliminary review and a
recommended decision. Indeed, as Congress has revised and expanded matters
that may be so referred, the Supreme Court repeatedly has tested each subsequent delegation, when there is no consent, according to one constant principle,
namely, that case-dispositive matters may be handled by magistrate judges provided that Article III district courts retain full and ultimate authority “to make an
informed, final determination” of the case.556

Judge Higginson ended his dissenting opinion stating,
It is said that a well-built house requires but little repairs. Article III federal
district judges are not over-burdened in their most essential judicial function,
trying federal criminal cases. Without consent, persons accused of federal offenses should not lose their liberty except after trial in a constitutional court, unless an Article III judge reserves “the ultimate decisionmaking authority.”557

Both opinions in Hollingsworth raise several questions. While the majority
opinion affirms the authority of magistrate judges to dispose of petty offense
cases arising from federal enclaves where the United States has sole territorial
jurisdiction under Clause 17 of Article I, the court’s decision explicitly does not
address whether magistrate judges have dispositional authority over petty offenses that arise on federal lands where jurisdiction is shared with a state or another entity. The authors of one treatise on public natural resources law estimated that federal enclaves created pursuant to Clause 17 “comprise less than 5
percent of federal land holdings.”558 The majority opinion would therefore appear to invite constitutional challenges to magistrate judge petty offense authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 in most federal lands.
In addition, Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion embraces the view that
magistrate judges are “adjuncts” to Article III judges, a view explicitly rejected

555

Id. at 563.
Id. at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1980)).
557 Id. at 570 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79
(1982)).
558 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 3:6 (2d ed. 2015).
556
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by the Supreme Court as applied to bankruptcy judges in Stern.559 Moreover,
Judge Higginson’s opinion repeatedly emphasizes that without consent “casedispositive matters may be handled by magistrate judges provided that Article
III district courts retain full and ultimate authority ‘to make an informed, final
determination’ of the case.”560 It therefore would appear that, should Judge
Higginson’s argument prevail in the future, the restoration of defendant consent
in petty offense cases, either by legislation or simply secured by a magistrate
judge at trial, might arguably resolve the constitutional problem.
Finally, none of the opinions in Hollingsworth, for all their extensive historical analysis, address the fact that Congress specifically amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401 in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 to remove the defendant’s consent in all petty offense cases.561 Nor do they attempt to analyze the
legislative history of this provision.
Along with Judge Higginson’s dissent in Hollingsworth, the Eleventh Circuit also questioned in dicta the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority
to dispose of petty offense cases in Brown v. United States, also discussed
above.562 While the panel in Brown held that a federal habeas corpus matter
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not a civil matter and thus could not be
disposed of by a magistrate judge with the consent of the parties under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), the majority opinion’s lengthy dicta called into question the
constitutionality under Article III of a magistrate judge disposing of any case in
federal court, including Class A misdemeanor and petty offense cases.563 In
particular, the majority stated,
[M]agistrate judges (and their predecessors, the commissioners) are not—and
have never purported to be—Article III judges. Instead, magistrate judges “draw
their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I
of the Constitution.” Although Congress considered magistrate judges to be “adjunct[s] of the United States District Court, appointed by the court and subject to
the court’s direction and control,” the fact is that when magistrate judges exercise their authority to try petty offenses and to enter final judgment in civil cases,
they are exercising the essential attributes of “judicial Power.” They do not function as mere adjuncts. They are puisne judges acting as courts. But Article III is
clear:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stat-

559

See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610–11 (2011).
Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d at 567 (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682–83).
561 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 202, 114 Stat. 2410,
2412–14.
562 See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1057–58, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014); see also
supra Section II.B.2.b.i(b).
563 Brown, 748 F.3d at 1057–58.
560
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ed Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
As previously recounted, magistrate judges do not hold life-tenure, nor is their
compensation undiminishable. Therefore, these puisne judges cannot exercise
“the judicial Power of the United States.”564

The views expressed in Judge Higginson’s dissent in Hollingsworth and
the majority’s dicta in Brown have so far not been followed by other courts, but
serve as a reminder that the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to
dispose of petty offense cases without the consent of the defendant arguably
remains unsettled.
3. Does Summary Contempt Authority and Expanded Criminal and Civil
Contempt Authority of Magistrate Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)
Violate Article III?
a. Congressional Expansion of Magistrate Judge Contempt Authority
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 greatly expanded magistrate
judge contempt authority.565 Section 636(e) of Title 28 was amended and completely changed by this legislation.566 Prior to these amendments, magistrate
judges had no direct authority to impose contempt sanctions of any kind and
could only certify a litigant or attorney’s contemptuous behavior to a district
judge for further proceedings under § 636(e). These changes are summarized
briefly below.
The amended § 636(e)(1) gave magistrate judges “the power to exercise
contempt authority as set forth in the other provisions of the amended § 636(e)
within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed by their appointments.”567 Section
636(e)(2) provided magistrate judges with summary criminal contempt authority to punish any misbehavior occurring in their presence “so as to obstruct the
administration of justice.”568 “Summary criminal contempt authority [was]
granted to magistrate judges to maintain order and to protect the court’s dignity
in response to contumacious behavior by witnesses, parties, counsel, and others
present at court proceedings.”569 Thus, “[w]hen presiding over cases or proceedings as the primary judicial officer for the district court, a magistrate judge
is provided appropriate immediate authority to control activity in the court564

Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)
(first quoting Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); then quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 96-287, at 8 (1979); and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
565 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 § 202, 114 Stat. at 2412–14.
566 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–97.
567 Memorandum from Thomas C. Hnatowski, Chief, Magistrate Judges Div. of the Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, to All U.S. Magistrate Judges attach. I, at 1 (Nov. 16, 2000) (on
file with author); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(1) (2012).
568 Id. § 636(e)(2); see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96.
569 Hnatowski, supra note 567.
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room. The limited penalties magistrate judges may impose for summary criminal contempts are set forth in § 636(e)(5),” which is summarized below.570
Section 636(e)(3) “gave magistrate judges additional criminal contempt authority in their civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and in misdemeanor cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”571 The section gave magistrate judges “authority to punish misbehavior occurring outside their presence that constitutes
disobedience or resistance to the magistrate judge’s lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command in civil consent and misdemeanor cases.”572 This authority permits “a magistrate judge to enforce his or her orders and to vindicate
the magistrate judge’s (and the court’s) authority over cases tried by the magistrate judge.”573
Section 636(e)(4) “authorizes magistrate judges to exercise civil contempt
authority in civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and in misdemeanor
cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”574 In such cases, this section enables the magistrate judge to “exercise civil contempt authority identical to the civil contempt
authority of a district judge.”575
Under § 636(e)(5), the penalties for criminal contempts that magistrate
judges may impose are limited:
Imprisonment for a summary criminal contempt committed in the magistrate
judge’s presence, or for a criminal contempt occurring in a civil consent or misdemeanor case outside the magistrate judge’s presence, may not exceed [thirty]
days incarceration (the maximum term of imprisonment for a Class C misdemeanor, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(8)), and a fine may not exceed $5,000
(the maximum fine that may be imposed upon an individual for a Class C misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(6)).576

These limits on the contempt penalties that magistrate judges could impose
were intended to clearly differentiate magistrate judge criminal contempt authority from that exercised by district judges. Moreover, these limits were modeled after the penalty limits in petty offense cases that magistrate judges may
dispose of without the defendant’s consent so that magistrate judge contempt
authority would better withstand constitutional scrutiny. For example, 18
U.S.C. § 401 “sets no limits upon [either] the fine or imprisonment penalties [a
district judge] may impose when punishing contemptuous behavior.”577 By
contrast, magistrate judge criminal contempt authority was strictly prescribed.578
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578

Id.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96.
Id.
Id.; accord Hnatowski, supra note 567.
Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2.
Id.; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96.
Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2.
Id. attach. II, at 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(5) (2012).
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Congress recognized that some “contumacious conduct may be so egregious as to require more severe punishment.”579 In such situations, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(e)(6) retained the certification procedure that existed “before enactment
of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000”:
If, in the opinion of the magistrate judge, a criminal contempt occurring in the
magistrate judge’s presence, or a criminal contempt in a civil consent or misdemeanor case, is sufficiently serious that [thirty] days incarceration or a $5,000
fine would not be an adequate punishment, the magistrate judge has the option
of certifying the facts to a district judge for further contempt proceedings.
The section also provides that in any other case or proceeding referred to a
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) or (b), or any other statute, criminal
contempts that occur outside the magistrate judge’s presence must [continue to]
be handled through the certification procedure. Under this provision, the magistrate judge [certifies] the facts constituting the contempt to a district judge to
show cause why that person should not be adjudged in contempt of court by the
facts so certified.
Finally, the section requires that certification procedures must also be used
for civil contempts that occur in any other case or proceedings referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) or (b), or any other statute.580

Finally, § 636(e)(7) provides that in civil consent cases under § 636(c), the
court of appeals hears appeals from a magistrate judge’s contempt order under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).581 “The appeal of any other order of contempt issued
under this section shall be made to the district court.”582
b. Constitutional Questions
To date, no federal court has analyzed whether the expanded magistrate
judge contempt authority set forth in the amended § 636(e) violates Article III
of the Constitution. Although one academic commentator suggested that the
summary contempt provision in the 2000 amendments to § 636(e) violates separation of powers principles under Article III,583 no court has yet raised or discussed this issue directly.584 A review of cases since 2000 where the contempt
provisions of § 636(e) have been cited shows that in most cases magistrate
judges have used the certification procedure under § 636(e)(6) to recommend
that district judges order contempt.585 At least one magistrate judge, however,
579

Id. § 636(e)(6).
Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2.
581 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(7).
582 Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I., at 3.
583 See Mark S. Kende, The Constitutionality of New Contempt Powers for Federal Magistrate Judges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 567, 569 (2002).
584 Cf. Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (arguing
that the 2000 amendment of the Federal Magistrates Act granting magistrate judges with
limited contempt authority was a justification for considering a motion for sanctions under
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 as a non-case-dispositive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)).
585 See, e.g., Stream Cos., Inc. v. Windward Advert., No. 12-cv-4549, 2013 WL 3761281, at
*10 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2013); Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., Nos. 11 Civ. 1590
580
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has exercised summary criminal contempt authority and imposed jail time on a
contemnor under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2).586
An examination of cases before 2000 that discuss magistrate judge’s contempt authority is instructive on how courts might approach challenges to the
expanded magistrate judge contempt authority. In the Seventh Circuit’s decision on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Geras v. Lafayette Display
Fixtures, Inc., the majority opinion discussed contempt authority as a clear line
demarcating the authority of Article III judges and non-Article III judicial officers. In particular, the majority stated:
Unlike the relatively mechanical entry of judgment, the power to punish for contempt of court is the means by which many court judgments, not including the
collection of money judgments, are enforced. Despite the effort of the dissent to
trivialize the significance of the contempt power, it remains the primary means
of enforcing many court judgments, particularly injunctions. The vesting of this
power exclusively in the hands of Article III judicial officers would seem, for
present purposes at least, to provide an adequate distinction between such judges
and non-Article III officers. This clear line also serves to limit the ultimate exercise of judicial power to persons enjoying the constitutional guarantee of independence.587

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion upholding the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v.
Instromedix, Inc., noted that the authority of Article III judges was preserved
under § 636(c) because “[d]istrict courts retain the power to adjudge a party in
contempt.”588
Four years before the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) were enacted, the
Ninth Circuit addressed whether a magistrate judge could exercise contempt
authority in a civil consent case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). In Bingman v. Ward,
the court ruled that a magistrate judge erred when he adjudicated a criminal
contempt sanction against a litigant in a civil consent case.589 The panel asserted that the exercise of contempt authority was an exclusive power of Article III

(LTS)(HBP), 11 Civ. 8726 (LTS)(HBP), 2013 WL 3487350, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2013),
vacated by 784 F.3d 99 (2015); Reed v. A & A Stanley Constr., Inc., No. 12-869
(MJD/LIB), 2013 WL 1065371, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2013); Lynch v. Southampton Animal Shelter Found., Inc., No. CV 10-2917(ADS)(ETB), 2013 WL 80178, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 7, 2013); Aetna Grp. USA, Inc. v. AIDCO Int’l, Inc., No. 1:11-mc-023, 2012 WL
3309049, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2012).
586 See United States v. Bryant, No. 2:14-CR-08, 2014 WL 2931051, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June
30, 2014) (holding a defendant in summary contempt under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(1) and FED.
R. CIV. P. 42(b) for appearing intoxicated at a felony initial appearance and sentencing the
defendant to fourteen days in jail).
587 Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984).
588 Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th
Cir. 1984).
589 Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1996).
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judges absent a specific act of Congress giving magistrate judges contempt authority.590
Plaintiff James Bingman, a state prisoner in Montana, brought suit in the
District of Montana against prison officials for alleged inadequate dental
care.591 The parties consented to have the case heard by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).592 After receiving evidence, the magistrate judge issued
a preliminary injunction ordering the prison officials to provide the plaintiff
with necessary dental care and to submit a proposal to eliminate deficiencies in
the prison’s dental care system.593 Dissatisfied with prison officials’ response to
the injunction, Bingman moved to have the officials held in contempt.594 The
magistrate judge granted this motion, ordering the prison officials to pay
$1,450 to the Clerk of Court because they had not submitted a plan within the
time allotted by the court, and $500 to the plaintiff because the officials had not
given him the expeditious dental care required by the order.595 The magistrate
judge stated that the sanctions were intended as punishment “for failing to timely and expeditiously comply with the terms . . . of the injunction, and, further,
to encourage adherence to this or other orders of [the] Court in the future.”596
On appeal, the defendants argued that the magistrate judge had no authority
to hold them in contempt.597 After finding that the magistrate judge’s ruling
was a criminal contempt order that could be reviewed through an interlocutory
appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants’ view, holding that magistrate judges have no authority under the Federal Magistrates Act to adjudicate
criminal contempts.598 Rejecting arguments that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Peretz somehow by analogy allowed magistrate judges to exercise contempt
authority, the court stated,
Moreover, criminal contempt proceedings are not the same as simple misdemeanor prosecutions or the conduct of voir dire in felony trials. Contempt
proceedings implicate the authority, the discretion, and the dignity of Article III
courts. They constitute “the ultimate exercise of judicial power . . . .” Congress
has carefully avoided conferring that power upon magistrate judges. The mere
fact that some analogies can be drawn between contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings does not mean that we should guard use of the contempt power
any less jealously than Congress did.599

590

Id. at 657.
Id. at 654.
592 Id. at 655.
593 Id.
594 Id.
595 Id.
596 Id. (alterations in original).
597 Id.
598 Id. at 656.
599 Id. at 658 (citation omitted) (quoting Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d
1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984)).
591
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Nevertheless, the court specifically did not rule on whether Congress had
authority under the Constitution to provide magistrate judges limited contempt
authority, simply stating, “It has not done so.”600 The court therefore vacated
the magistrate judge’s contempt order and remanded the case for further proceedings in which the magistrate judge was required to certify facts constituting
contempt to a district judge under the procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(e).601
Although as yet untested in a federal court, there are cogent arguments for
concluding that expanded magistrate judge contempt authority set forth in the
2000 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) does not violate Article III of the Constitution. In particular, applying the “structural” interest analysis to Article III
issues used by the Supreme Court in Schor, Peretz, and Wellness, it does not
appear that Congress provided magistrate judges with expanded contempt authority “in an effort to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.”602 Moreover,
in all other respects, district judges maintain their supervisory control over
magistrate judges in the same way that bankruptcy judges remain under the
control of Article III judges in a manner approved of by the Supreme Court in
Wellness.603
With regards to the “personal” interest prong protected under Article III, at
first blush it might be argued that the limited summary contempt provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 636(e) do not adequately protect individuals’ “personal” interests
under Article III because those affected by a magistrate judge’s exercise of
summary contempt authority do not consent to the magistrate judge’s actions.
Congress, however, has provided magistrate judges with non-consensual dispositional authority in petty offense cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 that arguably
does not offend the Constitution.604 Indeed, the strict limits on the summary and
criminal contempt penalties that magistrate judges may impose under
§ 636(e)(5) were intended to explicitly differentiate magistrate judge contempt
authority from that of Article III judges.605 It stands to reason that if the nonconsensual referral of all petty offense cases to magistrate judges for final disposition does not offend the Constitution, the summary imposition of limited
criminal contempt penalties by magistrate judges under § 636(e)(5) would also
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has declared that a “criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious [offense].”606 Viewed in this context, granting magistrate judges summary non600

Id.
Id.
602 Wellness Int’l. Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.1932, 1945 (2015).
603 See id. at 1945–46.
604 See supra Section II.C.2 (concluding that while some courts question the constitutionality of the power granted magistrate judges to dispose of petty cases in 18 U.S.C. § 3401, it
has not been held to be unconstitutional).
605 Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2.
606 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968).
601
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consensual criminal contempt authority with penalties limited to those for Class
C misdemeanors arguably does not offend the “personal” interests embodied in
Article III of the Constitution.
It remains to be seen, however, how these arguments would fare in the federal courts if the expanded magistrate judge contempt provisions in 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(e) were challenged on constitutional grounds.
III. THE EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE UTILIZATION SINCE 1990
A. Magistrate Judge Utilization: An Introduction
The nation’s federal magistrate judges perform more duties today than they
did twenty-five years ago. To confirm this basic fact and to get an idea of how
much “more,” one need look no further than the judiciary’s national statistics
on magistrate judge workload. From 1990 to 2014, the number of total matters607 handled by all magistrate judges in the nation increased 146 percent
(from 448,107 to 1,102,396).608
Building on the discussion of the expansion of magistrate judge authority
in Parts I and II of this article, Part III analyzes the growth in the utilization of
magistrate judges from 1990 to 2015 and the causal factors contributing to that
growth. It proposes to show that the expansion of utilization resulted not only
from larger volumes of cases and duties generally, but also from a broader
range of duties assigned to magistrate judges.
The expansion of magistrate judge utilization609 since 1990 does not appear
to have received much scholarly attention, with certain notable exceptions.610 It
607

“Total matters” is virtually every judicial proceeding regardless of type, including all
cases terminated in which magistrate judges presided (e.g., civil consent cases and petty offense cases), and all matters referred to magistrate judges in civil and criminal cases for determination or reports and recommendations, including discovery motions, evidentiary hearings, settlement conferences, initial appearances in felony cases, search warrants, etc.
608 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
The court statistics for 1990, unless otherwise indicated, refers to the 12-month period
ending June 30, 1990, and court statistics from 1992 onward unless otherwise indicated, refers to 12-month periods ending September 30 (due to a change in the Administrative Office’s statistical reporting year).
609 The “utilization” of magistrate judges is a term of art referring to the various types of
judicial duties that district judges, individually, and district courts, collectively, delegate to
magistrate judges throughout ninety-four district courts. The concept encompasses two signature qualities of the work of United States magistrate judges: (1) the extensive judicial authority of the office conferred by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012), and (2) the broad discretion that Congress gave to district judges to determine which of these authorized duties to
delegate to magistrate judges to meet local needs and conditions, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A).
See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 64 (2014),
http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/A-Guide-to-the-Federal-Magistrate-JudgeSystem.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://perma.cc/99UK-8FY4].
610 See, e.g., MCCABE, supra note 609; CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE
CASE STUDIES (1985); Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Fed-

LEE - 16 NEV. L.J. 845 - FINAL

926

6/20/2016 5:57 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:845

has been the subject of occasional articles in legal periodicals611 and the print
media.612 In Part III of this article, the authors approach the subject using the
extensive statistics maintained by the Administrative Office on matters handled
by magistrate judges and practical knowledge obtained through their work experience as senior attorneys in the Administrative Office.
Congress and the Judicial Conference have promoted the full utilization of
magistrate judges in the interest of responsible stewardship of judicial resources
and to fulfill the purposes of the magistrate judges system. In 1983, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in its report to Congress
that the utilization of magistrate judges should be expanded.613 In response to
that report, the Judicial Conference endorsed actions “to encourage the further
use of magistrates” at its March 1984 session.614 Nearly twenty-five years ago,
the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System of the
eral Courts, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 661 (2005); Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal
Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 475 (2002); Dessem, supra note 101; George C. Hanks, Jr., Searching from Within:
The Role of Magistrate Judges in Federal Multi-District Litigation, 99 JUDICATURE, May
2015, at 46; Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21; James G. Woodward & Michael E. Penick,
Expanded Utilization of Federal Magistrate Judges: Lessons from the Eastern District of
Missouri, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 543 (1999). See generally JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE
JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012) (discussing institutional specialization in the judicial branch in the post-war period, including
establishment of the modern magistrate judges system); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996) (providing background and analysis of the growth
in the federal caseload since 1960 and the institutional reforms in response); Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4 (providing a detailed account of the historical
origins of the office of magistrate judge and evolution of its judicial powers dating back to
United States Commissioners); Jack B. Streepy, The Developing Role of the Magistrate in
the Federal Courts, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 81 (1980) (discussing developments in magistrate
judge authority and utilization nationally and particularly in the Northern District of Ohio
during the author’s service there as a United States magistrate judge).
611 See, e.g., Michael Newman, Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts: A Special Issue,
61 FED. LAW. May/June 2014, at 33.
612 See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow & Craig Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law
Enforcement Requests for Electronic Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/low-level-federal-judges-balking-at-lawenforcement-requests-for-electronic-evidence/2014/04/24/eec81748-c01b-11e3-b195dd0c1174052c_story.html [https://perma.cc/7F3X-46GQ]; Joe Palazzolo, Magistrate Judges
Play a Larger Role, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 5:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/art
icles/magistrate-judges-play-a-larger-role-1428355226.
613 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-83-46, COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM CAN BE
BETTER REALIZED 18–19 (1983). The GAO found that some district judges did not use magistrate judges as extensively as they could, for various reasons. It recommended, among other things, that the Judicial Conference encourage courts to use magistrate judges “for all
types of judicial and administrative duties, whenever possible and practical,” to have a positive impact on the courts’ caseloads. Id.
614 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 20
(Mar. 1984).
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Judicial Conference described the mission of the federal magistrate judges system in these words:
The mission of the magistrate judges system is to provide the federal district
courts with supportive and flexible supplemental judicial resources. The magistrate judges system is available to cope with the ever-changing demands made
on the federal judiciary, thereby improving public access to the courts, promoting prompt and efficient case resolution, and preserving scarce Article III resources.615

Magistrate judge utilization has expanded greatly over the past quarter century by any measure. For example, the volume of all matters handled by magistrate judges nationally surpassed one million for the first time in the 2000s,616
and from 1990 to 2014, the Judicial Conference authorized over 200 new fulltime magistrate judge positions.617 Since 1990, magistrate judges have exercised plenary authority with consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in
more civil cases, including several high-profile cases.618 Also, Congress
changed the title of the office from “magistrate” to “magistrate judge” to more
accurately reflect the judicial duties of the office.619 Likewise, the Judicial Conference agreed in March 2004 to include a magistrate judge observer at its sessions for the first time.620
At the same time, however, looking back at magistrate judge utilization
since 1990 evokes in the observer the familiar saying that “the more things
change, the more they stay the same.” There are several reasons for this impression, but four are mentioned here. First, while the utilization of magistrate
judges has expanded, the basic mission of the magistrate judges system “to
615

Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1526 (quoting MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN, supra
note 170, at 3-1).
616 Magistrate judges disposed of 1,065,413 total matters in 2004. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013, at tbl.S-17 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statis
tics/table/s-17/judicial-business/2013/09/30 [https://perma.cc/9SBE-4W29].
617 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56.
618 See, e.g., Dep’t of Fair Emp’t and Hous. v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., No. 12cv-01830-JCS, 2015 WL 4719613, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (granting in part and
denying in part appeal of report of panel of experts regarding application of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 to accommodations for disabilities while taking the Law
School Admission Test); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014) (holding
Idaho’s marriage laws unconstitutional in prohibiting same-sex marriage and not recognizing
legal out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples residing in Idaho); Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that the requested use of a golf cart by
a disabled professional golfer in a golf tournament is a required accommodation under the
ADA).
619 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 101 Stat. 5089,
5117.
620 As approved by the Judicial Conference, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist selected a
magistrate judge and a bankruptcy judge for two-year terms to attend sessions of the Judicial
Conference as non-voting observers, a practice that has been continued by Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s successor, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. See JCUS-MAR 2004, supra note
55, at 22.
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provide the federal district courts with supportive and flexible supplemental judicial resources” has not changed.621 Second, decisions on how magistrate
judges are to be used remain in the hands of district judges at the local district
court level. Third, the utilization of magistrate judges varies widely from district to district, and this variation still extends to some degree to disparities in
the range of duties given to magistrate judges. Fourth, while this paper concludes that while nationally magistrate judges are generally utilized for a
broader range of duties today than in 1990, many courts continue to rely on
magistrate judges as “specialists” in particular areas (for example, prisoner cases and social security appeals).
This part of the article has four sections. The first is a review of the national policies that favor flexibility and innovation in magistrate judge utilization.
The second section analyzes the global expansion of magistrate judge utilization and its causes from 1990 to 2015. The third section narrows the focus to
examine three recent growth areas of magistrate judge utilization: (1) felony
guilty plea proceedings, (2) search warrants and investigative orders, and (3)
civil cases adjudicated to finality by magistrate judges on consent of the parties.
The final section will attempt an initial inquiry into the institutional challenges
posed by the ways magistrate judges are actually used compared with advice on
best practices for the effective use of magistrate judges. The section will consider, in particular, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations and the role of magistrate judges
as “specialists” in certain areas.
B. National Policies Favoring Flexibility and Innovation
“Flexibility has been the hallmark of the magistrate judges system
throughout its development.”622 As acknowledged by Congress in 1979, the
magistrate judges system is designed to “improve access to justice on a districtby-district basis.”623 Reporting to Congress in 1981, the Judicial Conference
observed that the Federal Magistrates Act “does not contemplate uniformity
from district to district in the actual assignment of duties to magistrates,” but
rather “[f]lexibility and diversity are a necessary part of the genius of the magistrates system.”624
Since the early years of the magistrate judges system, there have been wide
variations in the duties assigned to magistrate judges from court to court and,
even, from district judge to district judge within the same court.625 These varia621

See supra note 615 and accompanying text.
Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1527.
623 S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 4 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N 1469, 1472.
624 THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1981).
625 Id. (“Even within a given district court, the use of magistrates will not always be uniform.”). The 1981 Report to the Congress quoted a study conducted in the Southern and
622
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tions are beneficial, but they result in differences in the range and volume of
duties of magistrate judges system-wide.626
Congress has also encouraged courts to be innovative in using magistrate
judges. Innovative uses are impliedly authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3),
which broadly states, “A magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.”627 The House Report to the 1976 jurisdictional amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act commented on the purpose of § 636(b)(3):
This subsection enables the district courts to continue innovative experimentations in the use of this judicial officer. . . .
....
If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will be increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of
their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both
efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal courts.628

Eastern Districts of New York that described individualized utilization of magistrate judges
by district judges:
Each judge determines how the magistrates can work most effectively. Since
each judge has his own areas of competence and expertise, he can utilize magistrates
to assist him in different ways, say, for all pretrial matters or a limited part of the
case. The high degree of flexibility in magistrate use depending on the magistrate’s
and judge’s expertise is an important element underlying the magistrates system.
Id. (quoting Steven Puro, Roger L. Goldman & Alice M. Padawer-Singer, The Evolving Role
of U.S. Magistrates in the District Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 437, 444 (1981) (footnote omitted)).
626 See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 23. Peter G. McCabe, the first chief of the Magistrate
Judges Division of the Administrative Office, from 1972 to 1982, and Assistant Director for
Judges Programs of the Administrative Office, from 1982 to 2013, noted that flexibility has
resulted in “substantial disparity in usage” in his 2014 white paper on the magistrate judges
system: “This flexibility has been beneficial, and most districts use their Magistrate Judges
broadly and imaginatively. But it has also led to substantial disparity in usage of Magistrate
Judges among the courts, based on differences in caseloads, local conditions, and the preferences of District Judges.” Id.
627 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (2012).
628 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
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C. Expansion of Duties of Magistrate Judges from 1990 to 2014
FIGURE 1
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As noted above, the aggregate number of duties performed by magistrate
judges nationally increased dramatically from 1990 to 2014, more than doubling from 448,107 to 1,102,396 matters.629 (See Figure 1). The largest shares
of additional matters disposed of were in referred matters in civil cases, referred matters in felony cases, and initial proceedings in felony cases.630 The
growth in each of these areas are discussed in more detail below. Civil consent
cases increased substantially from 1990 to 2014, growing 222 percent (from
4,958 to 15,959).631 Reports and recommendations in prisoner cases also increased, but by a much smaller margin—27 percent (from 20,583 to 26,140).632
There were exceptions to the growth trend in some categories, however.633
629

See supra note 608 and accompanying text.
Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
631 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
632 Prisoner cases are comprised of prisoner civil rights cases, state habeas corpus cases,
federal habeas corpus cases and motions to vacate sentence. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
633 The numbers of reports and recommendations in social security appeals rose only slightly, by 15 percent (from 5,112 to 5,881), although filings in these appeals increased overall by
almost 160 percent (from 7,439 to 19,146). This discrepancy is attributable, in part, to a
630
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In general, the expansion in duties performed by magistrate judges was
caused or enabled by four factors: (1) expansion of magistrate judge authority
by statute and case law, (2) growth in case filings and workload in the district
courts, (3) increased magistrate judge resources in the district courts, and (4)
larger volumes of traditional magistrate judge duties and a broader range of duties assigned to magistrate judges. The first factor, the expansion of magistrate
judge authority, was discussed in Parts I and II. Clearly, a precondition to any
growth in the duties of magistrate judges is the legal authority they have to
conduct their assigned duties. As the expansion of authority has already been
discussed, this section will focus on the other three factors.
1. Caseload
The statistics indicate that increases in district court caseload alone were
less of a factor in the expansion of magistrate judge utilization than might be
expected. From 1960 to 1985, the district courts experienced extraordinary
growth in total filings (from 80,891 to 312,556).634 From 1990 to 2014, case
filings continued to rise but at a much less rapid rate (from 284,220 to
376,536).635 Despite the slower growth in caseload after 1985, however, the
numbers of matters disposed of by magistrate judges rose dramatically from
1995 to 2005 (from 512,741 to 1,063,907).636 In 2005, the rate of increase
dropped off considerably, so that, from 2005 to 2014, the numbers increased
slightly overall (from 1,063,907 to 1,102,396).637 As a result, from 1995 to
2014, total matters disposed of by magistrate judges increased 115 percent
while total case filings grew 20 percent.638 Therefore, the widening gap bemarked increase in social security appeals that were disposed of by magistrate judges on
consent of the parties during the relevant period. Dispositions of Class A misdemeanors by
magistrate judges decreased by 37 percent during this period (from 13,248 to 8,351). The
reduction correlates with a decrease in filings of misdemeanor defendant offenses during that
period (from 14,938 to 8,774). Dispositions of petty offense cases by magistrate judges increased marginally from 1990 to 2014 (from 87,682 to 98,303). See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.4.4. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at
tbls.D-1 & S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbls.D-1 & S-17.
634 POSNER, supra note 610, at 56–64, 391–93 & tbl.A.2.
635 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, tbls.4.1 & 5.1. From 1990 to
2014, civil filings grew from 217,879 to 295,310 (up 77,000 filings, 36 percent), and criminal defendant filings grew from 66,341 to 81,226 (up almost 15,000 filings, 22 percent). Id.
636 Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 1999, at tbl.S-18
(1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-1999 [https://perma.cc/
5RPA-M2K8], with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
637 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. From 2010 to 2014, matters disposed of by magistrate judges decreased slightly overall (from 1,103,649 to 1,102,396), after
peaking in 2013 (1,181,874). Id. The cause of the overall decrease from 2010 to 2014 appears to have been a decrease in felony filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.5.1.
638 This observation is made realizing that aggregate matters disposed of by magistrate judges will always be greater than cases filed because “matters disposed of” include multiple
proceedings arising from each case. Nevertheless, from 1995 to 2014, the ratio of the in-
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tween the growth in magistrate judge duties and case filings suggests that, although rising case filings were a contributing factor, they were not decisive but
were one of a number of factors leading to the increase in duties performed by
magistrate judges after 1990.
A more useful standard for assessing caseloads is the workload of judges,
as measured by weighted caseload per district judgeship.639 The national statistics on weighted caseload indicate that, on average, the workload of judges in
all district courts increased over the past twenty-five years. From 1990 to 2015,
the average number of weighted case filings per district judgeship in all district
courts rose from 448 to 522.640 The authors of this paper conclude that the following caseload-related factors contributed to the increase in magistrate judge
utilization from 1990 to 2015: (1) more time-consuming cases due to increased
legal and evidentiary complexity; (2) the cumulative effects of the previous
twenty-five year expansion in caseload; (3) and a continuing, albeit gradual,
rise in the caseloads of district courts generally. As a result of these factors, it is
hypothesized that district judges delegated more duties to magistrate judges to
help them better manage their time and their caseloads.
2. Magistrate Judge Resources
As noted in Part I, the number of full-time magistrate judge positions increased by 56 percent over the past twenty-five years.641 The number of new
full-time magistrate judge positions authorized by the Judicial Conference increased considerably in the five-year span from 1990 to 1995 from 329 to 416
positions.642 From 1995 to 2005, the number of new positions continued to increase in “matters disposed of” to the increase in case filings was quite high, 6:1, indicating
expansive use of magistrate judges. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 636;
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, supra note 56, at tbls.4.1 & 5.1.
639 “Weighted caseload” is an Administrative Office statistic that
account[s] for the different amounts of time district judges require to resolve various types of
civil and criminal actions. The Federal Judiciary has employed techniques for assigning weights
to cases since 1946. . . . Average civil cases or criminal defendants each receive a weight of approximately 1.0; for more time-consuming cases, higher weights are assessed . . . ; and cases
demanding relatively little time from judges receive lower weights . . . .

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, EXPLANATION OF SELECTED TERMS 1 (2015). Judge Posner has opined on the utility of weighted caseload statistics thusly: “Without statistics it
would be impossible to know when a court should be enlarged. For this purpose, however,
raw caseload statistics are inadequate. A case is not a uniform measure, like a dollar. The
relevant statistic is not caseload but workload, which is to say, weighted caseload.” See
POSNER, supra note 610, at 227–31.
640 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at tbl.6.2
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures-2015 [https://per
ma.cc/Q6B5-TX68].
641 See discussion supra Section I.B.1.c and notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
642 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56. Under the Federal Magistrates
Act, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge positions, in the light of rec-
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crease, but at a lower rate spread over ten years (from 416 to 503 positions).643
From 2005 to 2010, the growth in new full-time magistrate judge positions
abated significantly (increasing by 24 new positions to 527), and from 2010 to
2014 the new positions were authorized at an even lower rate (increasing by 7
new positions to 534).644
When the trend in creating new full-time magistrate judge positions is
compared to the increase in total matters disposed of by magistrate judges, interesting patterns emerge. From 1990 to 1995, during the greatest surge in new
magistrate judge positions, the increase that occurred in matters disposed of
was relatively moderate. However, from 1995 to 2005, the increase in duties
performed “took off” (increasing from 512,741 to 1,063,907 matters). (See
Figure 1). The upward trends in positions and matters disposed of did not continue after 2005. From 2005 to 2010, when the number of new magistrate judge
positions sharply decreased, there was a parallel drop-off in the rate of increase
in matters disposed of by magistrate judges.645
It is difficult to know what to make of these parallel trends in the statistics
on new magistrate judge positions and duties performed by magistrate judges,
particularly with respect to the parallel upward trends from 1995 to 2005. There
seems to be a correlation, but the real connections between these two variables
are not clear without further study. There is a “chicken-or-the-egg” question
whether more duties were performed because more positions were created, or
whether more positions were created because more duties were performed.646
There is also a question as to why there was an apparent delay in the steep increase of duties performed until after 1995, especially when the period of the
greatest increase in new positions occurred throughout the previous five years,
1990 to 1995.647 In view of these issues, the question of the causal relationship

ommendations of the Director of the Administrative Office, the district courts, and the circuit
judicial councils. See 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (2012).
643 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56.
644 Id.
645 See supra note 636 and accompanying text.
646 Moreover, it cannot be inferred from the data that the increase in total matters disposed
of by magistrate judges was caused solely by the increase in magistrate judge positions. If
the increase in total matters disposed of was caused merely by the increase in new positions,
it seems logical that the average number of total matters performed per full-time magistrate
judge position would remain relatively constant. However, the national average of total matters performed per full-time magistrate judge position increased from 1990 to 2014 (from
1,362 to 2,076), even as the numbers of new full-time magistrate judge positions were increasing significantly (from 329 to 534 at the end of fiscal years 1990 and 2014, respectively). Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. Therefore, while the increase in positions certainly contributed to the increase in total matters disposed of, the large increase in matters disposed of
seemed to be fueled by more than new magistrate judges doing the work.
647 A possible explanation for the delay may be that from 1990 to 1995 the number of parttime magistrate judge positions were decreasing as the number of full-time magistrate judge
positions were increasing, therefore increases in duties performed due to the new full-time
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between new magistrate judge positions and increased utilization of magistrate
judges is beyond the scope of this paper. However, common sense suggests that
the probable effect of adding new magistrate judge positions would be an increase in the overall output of magistrate judges, assuming that the increase in
capacity (new positions) satisfied an increasing demand for the services of
magistrate judges (i.e., matters referred by district judges). Therefore, based on
the parallel statistical trends described above, it can be conservatively concluded that, but for the great increase in new full-time magistrate judge positions
from 1990 to 2005, the increase in total matters disposed of would not have
been as large as it was.648
3. More Duties and a Broader Range of Duties
For purposes of this analysis, the expansion of magistrate judge utilization
can be divided into at least two different types. The first type, which could be
called “intensified utilization,” refers to an increased volume of duties in a type
of duty that magistrate judges are already assigned, such as would occur, for
example, if social security filings increased, causing an increase in the amount
of social security appeals referred to magistrate judges. The second type, which
might be called “broadened utilization,” refers to the broadening of assignments into duty categories in which magistrate judges have not been utilized
before, such as would occur if a court began referring discovery motions in civil cases to magistrate judges where, previously, the court had only referred settlement conferences. Broadened utilization indicates that magistrate judges are
being used more extensively over a range of duties, which has been a national
goal.649 The data from 1990 to 2014 suggests that the expansion of utilization
during that period was a combination of both broadened and intensified utilization.
Statistical data indicate that from 1990 to 2014, the largest shares of the
expansion in utilization were in three broad categories: (1) pretrial matters and
additional duties in civil cases, (2) pretrial matters and additional duties in felopositions may have been offset by immediate decreases in duties performed by part-time
magistrate judges whose positions were abolished. See supra Section I.B.1.c.
648 Another aspect of judicial resources, or lack thereof, which was discussed supra Section
I.B.1.c, is the discrepancy from 1990 onward between the low number of new district judgeships created and the greater number of new magistrate judge positions. The lack of additional district judgeships led courts, particularly the busier courts, to seek additional magistrate judge positions. However, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge
positions based on the court’s need for magistrate judge resources and not in lieu of additional district judgeships. While there can be overlap between duties performed by district
judges and magistrate judges, magistrate judges are non-Article III judges and their authority
is not coextensive with the authority of district judges. For example, it is universally recognized that magistrate judges have no authority to try felony cases or conduct sentencings in
felony cases. Therefore, the two types of judges are not interchangeable.
649 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 101
(1995); cf. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2008).
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ny cases,650 and (3) initial proceedings in criminal cases. Each of these categories is discussed below.
a. Civil Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties
The prime example of broader utilization of magistrate judges is the expansion of pretrial matters and additional duties in civil cases referred to magistrate
judges651 from 1990 to 2014. During this period, referred civil matters disposed
of by magistrate judges increased from 114,968 to 371,672.652
Using seventy or less as a baseline value denoting a small number of civil
pretrial duties referred to magistrate judges (excluding evidentiary hearings) in
a given court, the number of courts that reported seventy or less civil pretrial
matters handled by magistrate judges decreased from nine courts to one court
from 1990 to 2014.653 Therefore, the statistics suggest that in 1990 there were
nine courts that were not utilizing magistrate judges to an appreciable extent in
general civil cases, but by 2014, virtually all courts were using magistrate judges to handle civil pretrial matters routinely, albeit in varying amounts.
It should be noted that the use of magistrate judges for judicial settlement
of cases was an important part of the expansion of magistrate judge utilization
in civil cases after 1990. From 1990 to 2014, the numbers of settlement conferences conducted by magistrate judges increased 63 percent (from 12,656 to
20,641).654
There were several causal factors that generated increased referrals of civil
matters to magistrate judges. As discussed above, two factors were the gradual
rise in civil filings and the increase in the number of authorized magistrate
650

The first and second categories are matters referred to magistrate judges in civil and felony cases that are assigned to district judges, as distinguished from cases assigned to magistrate judges as the presiding judge, such as civil consent cases and petty offense cases.
651 These matters include referred non-case-dispositive pretrial motions, settlement conferences and other pretrial conferences, evidentiary hearings, special masterships, and reports
and recommendations on referred case-dispositive motions in non-consent civil cases, including social security appeals but not including prisoner cases. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
652 The actual increase was not as large as the bare statistics indicate because certain types
of matters, including uncontested non-case-dispositive motions, were added to this category
for the first time in 2000, causing a large spike in the aggregate number that year. When the
statistics are adjusted to take this change into account, the increase in referred civil matters
from 1990 to 2014 is still estimated to have been substantial, about 70 percent. The reporting
of these data for the first time in 2000 increased the total number of referred civil matters by
about 100,000 in 2000. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
653 The one court in 2014 was the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, which is
the only court in the nation that has one magistrate judge who is in a combination clerk of
court/magistrate judge position (receiving no additional salary or staff for judicial duties),
and who reports few judicial duties. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra
note 57, at 283–84 tbl.M-4A, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-4A.
654 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
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judge positions. But the main impetus in the early part of this period was the
civil justice reform legislation of 1990, which is discussed in Part I of this paper.655 The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 “actually enhanced the potential
role and status of federal magistrate judges,” and Title I of that legislation, the
CJRA of 1990, created an opportunity for each district court to review the role
and utilization of its magistrate judges in civil cases.656
The CJRA required all district courts to adopt a civil justice expense and
delay reduction plan after considering recommendations of a local advisory
group appointed by each chief district judge in consultation with the other
judges.657 In general, these plans and recommendations recognized the significant role of magistrate judges in civil pretrial management.658 The CJRA led to
more extensive utilization of magistrate judges in civil cases, although many
courts had already established case management practices involving magistrate
judges before the CJRA.659 These reports and plans made a wide variety of recommendations regarding the use of magistrate judges, including promoting the
referral of pretrial conferences and discovery motions to magistrate judges, referral of settlement conferences to magistrate judges, and taking steps to encourage parties to consent to full adjudication of consent cases by magistrate
judges.660
b. Felony Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties
Another example of broadened utilization from 1990 to 2014 was referred
pretrial and additional matters in felony cases,661 dispositions of which increased from 35,576 to 182,230.662 To illustrate the effects of broadened utili655

See supra Part I.B.1.
Dessem, supra note 101, at 811. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report concluded:
“[G]iven the increasingly heavy demands of the civil and criminal dockets and the increasingly high quality of the magistrates themselves, . . . magistrates can and should play an important role, particularly in the pretrial and case management process.” LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823).
657 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090–96
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012)).
658 See Dessem, supra note 101, at 811.
659 Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1521.
660 Dessem, supra note 101, at 811–41; see also Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1520–
22.
661 Pretrial and additional duties in felony cases include non-case-dispositive motions, reports and recommendations on case-dispositive motions, pretrial conferences, probation and
supervised release revocation hearings, evidentiary hearings, felony guilty plea proceedings,
and miscellaneous other matters. This category is distinguished from initial proceedings in
felony cases, which refer to such proceedings as search warrants, initial appearances, and
pretrial detention hearings. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
662 As with the statistics on civil matters, the actual increase in felony duties was not as large
as indicated in the statistical data because certain types of matters, including uncontested
non-case-dispositive motions and felony guilty plea proceedings, were added to this category
for the first time in 2000, causing a large one-year increase in the aggregate number. When
656
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zation, in 1990 there were twenty district courts that reported thirty or fewer
felony pretrial matters handled by magistrate judges, but in 2014 that number
had decreased to one (the Northern Mariana Islands).663
Innovation is a theme in magistrate judge utilization in felony pretrial matters. One of the most significant examples of this is the referral of felony guilty
plea proceedings to magistrate judges as an “additional duty” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3).664 This was an innovative practice when it began in the 1980s in a
few courts and became a routine practice in the southwest border courts and
many other districts.665 The national expansion of referrals of felony guilty
pleas is discussed in more detail below. More recently, an innovative duty for
magistrate judges that has been adopted in a number of courts is presiding over
“reentry court” proceedings. “Reentry courts” themselves are innovative programs in federal district courts, which offer community-based services, such as
drug treatment and job skills training, with regularly scheduled appearances before a judge as a beneficial alternative to traditional post-conviction supervised
release.666
Another innovative use of magistrate judges in felony cases has been supervised release revocation proceedings. In 1992, an amendment to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401 allowed district judges to designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings to modify, revoke, or terminate supervised release, including evidentiary
hearings, and to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the
district judge.667 Some courts had referred supervised release proceedings to
magistrate judges for reports and recommendations before these amendments.
The total number of probation and supervised release revocation proceedings
conducted by magistrate judges nationally grew from 1990 to 2014 (from 529
to 2,521).668

the statistics are adjusted to account for this change, the actual increase in referred felony
matters from 1990 to 2014 is still estimated to have been quite large, about 280 percent.
Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
663 Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 57, at 281–82 tbl.M-4, with
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163.
664 See Baker, supra note 610, at 679.
665 See infra Section III.D.1.
666 See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 56–57.
667 See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) (2012); MCCABE, supra note 609, at 55–56.
668 See supra note 663. It is interesting to note that the innovative use that was the subject of
a leading case on magistrate judge authority, Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991),
the referral of voir dire in felony cases to magistrate judges, has not become a widespread
practice, although there are a number of courts that refer felony voir dire to magistrate judges occasionally on an ad hoc basis. In 2014, only 316 voir dires were conducted by magistrate judges, in civil and criminal cases. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M3A. Magistrate judges conducted these voir dires in varying numbers in 40 courts, but conducted none of them in 54 courts that year. Id.
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Initial Proceedings in Criminal Cases

The third main area of expansion in magistrate judge utilization is initial
proceedings in criminal cases.669 This is an example of intensified utilization.
There is a long history in the federal courts of assigning felony preliminary duties to subordinate federal officers, going back to the predecessors of magistrate
judges, U.S. Commissioners.670 With some exceptions, all these proceedings
are assigned to magistrate judges in all district courts, and therefore, the number of such duties performed by magistrate judges is closely related to the levels of felony filings.671
From 1990 to 2014, the number of felony preliminary proceedings conducted by magistrate judges increased 119 percent (from 157,987 to
346,318)672 which coincided with the 22 percent rise in felony defendant filings
during the same period (from 66,341 to 81,226).673 A major factor in the increase in felony preliminary proceedings conducted by magistrate judges was
search warrants, which increased tremendously from 1990 to 2014 (from
20,672 to 61,758).674
In summary, the primary causes of the large expansion of magistrate judge
utilization over the past twenty-five years appear to be the general broadening
of magistrate judge utilization in district courts for various duties in civil and
criminal cases and intensified utilization in initial proceedings in criminal cases. The incremental increase in the caseload of the district courts during the relevant period was a contributing factor, but not decisive; however, the rising
overall national workload of the courts, as measured by weighted caseload and
other factors, was an important factor. The significant number of new magistrate judge positions that were added to the system during the first half of the
period led to a greater expansion of utilization than would have occurred without the new positions. Therefore, the national trend from 1990 to 2015 was toward full utilization of magistrate judges, consistent with the judiciary’s 1984
endorsement of actions to “encourage the further use of magistrate[ judges].”675

669

Initial proceedings include search warrants, arrest warrants, initial appearances, preliminary examinations, arraignments, and pretrial detention hearings. As with civil case filings,
the matters performed by magistrate judges in felony cases are always greater than the number of filings of cases. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, tbl.S-17.
670 Foschio, supra note 610, at ¶¶ [1]–[II.15]; see MCCABE, supra note 609, at 8–10.
671 Even with initial proceedings, however, local variations exist that lead to differences in
utilization from district to district, including variations in types of felony cases, variations in
investigative activities, prosecutorial policies determining the frequency of pretrial detention,
and variations in preliminary examinations.
672 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
673 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.5.1.
674 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
675 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10.
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D. Growth Trends in Utilization of Magistrate Judges for Specific Types of
Proceedings
This section will highlight certain growth trends that contributed to the expansion of magistrate judge utilization since 1990 in felony guilty plea proceedings, search warrants, and civil consent cases.
1. Felony Guilty Pleas
The expansion of the authority of magistrate judges to conduct felony
guilty plea proceedings with the consent of the parties was analyzed in Part II
of this paper.676 As discussed, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz v. United States, decided in 1991, clarified the legal basis for the referrals of these
proceedings to magistrate judges.677 After Peretz, felony-guilty-plea proceedings became the largest growth area in magistrate judge utilization and are a
good example of broader utilization during the period. From 2000, when the
Administrative Office began capturing this data, to 2014, the number of felony
guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges almost tripled, increasing from 10,614 to 29,536.678
Historically, most felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate
judges have been in the five district courts along the southwest border—
Southern District of California, District of Arizona, District of New Mexico,
Western District of Texas, and Southern District of Texas.679 The referrals are
necessary in these courts to help the districts cope with extremely large numbers of immigration and drug cases.680 The felony guilty pleas in these courts
are in the thousands,681 far more than in other courts. However, since 1990, the
practice of referring felony guilty plea proceedings has expanded to many, but
not all, district courts throughout the nation. In 2014, magistrate judges conducted felony guilty plea proceedings in widely varying amounts in fifty-seven
of ninety-four district courts, not including the southwest border courts.682
The numbers of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate
judges increased 40 percent nationally from 2005 to 2014.683 From 2005 to
2011, they rose 54 percent, with most of the increase occurring in the southwest
676

See supra Part II.B.1.
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932–33 (1991).
678 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra
note 163.
679 In 2014, more than one-half of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate
judges were in the five southwest border courts. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note
163.
680 For example, the Southern District of Texas had 4,744 immigration defendant filings and
1,082 drug defendant filings in 2014. See id. at tbl.D-3.
681 For example, the magistrate judges in the Southern District of Texas conducted 2,911
felony guilty plea proceedings in 2014. Id. at tbl.M-4.
682 Id.
683 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
677
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border courts.684 The numbers peaked in 2011 at 32,682.685 Since then, the
numbers have fluctuated slightly from year to year.686
The practice of referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges is emblematic of the flexibility of the magistrate judges system. It is important to remember that, despite its growth nationally, acceptance of the practice by district judges is far from unanimous. To illustrate, thirty-two district
courts of various sizes throughout all twelve geographic circuits reported no
felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges in 2014.687 In
the courts where these proceedings are referred, it is not uncommon for some of
the district judges to refer them either routinely or on an ad hoc basis, while
other district judges in the court choose not to refer them at all.
2. Search Warrants
One of the largest growth areas in magistrate judge utilization based on statistical data is one that has a relatively low public profile—search warrants, as
that category is defined in Administrative Office statistics.688 In 1990, magistrate judges handled 20,672 search warrants (not an insignificant number
then).689 By 2014, the number of search warrants had risen dramatically to
61,758.690 Most of the growth occurred after the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001. The number increased 75 percent from 2005 to 2014 (from 35,155 to
61,758) and 42 percent from 2010 to 2014 (from 43,435 to 61,758).691
Magistrate judges handle the vast majority of felony preliminary proceedings in the district courts, including search warrants, arrest warrants, criminal
complaints, initial appearances, arraignments, and pretrial detention hearings.
But while the total number of felony preliminary proceedings conducted by
magistrate judges nearly doubled from 1990 to 2014, the number of search warrants alone nearly trebled during that period.692

684

See id. at tbls.M-4 & S-17.
Id.
686 Id.
687 See id. at tbl.M-4.
688 “Search warrants,” as the term is used for statistical purposes in the Administrative Office, is a broad generic category that includes not only traditional search warrants issued under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, but also numerous other orders authorizing searches and seizures
based on probable cause or a lesser standard, including pen registers, trap and trace devices,
and newer kinds of searches and surveillance, such as mobile tracking devices, cell phone
tracking techniques, and disclosure of stored electronic communications. See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 26–28.
689 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
690 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
691 See id.
692 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
685
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Magistrate judges have the authority to issue search warrants under the
Federal Magistrates Act693 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b).694
United States commissioners had the authority to issue search warrants for specific federal offenses,695 and magistrate judges inherited that authority through
the Federal Magistrates Act, which, among other things, gave magistrate judges
“all powers and duties conferred or imposed on United States commissioners.”696
Several factors have led to the increase in search warrants, the most obvious being the intensified investigations of terrorist activity since September 11,
but also the prevalence of electronic and audio communications via the internet
and cell phones, continuing advancements in search and surveillance technologies, and the increased use of these technologies in criminal investigations.697
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and other rules and statutes have also
required magistrate judges to grapple with multiple new surveillance technologies when deciding whether to issue search warrants. A review of recent cases
reveals numerous examples where magistrate judges have considered applications for warrants or other search and surveillance orders involving cell phones,
historic cell site information, electronic data under the Stored Communications
Act,698 and other investigative technologies.699

693
694

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (2012).
FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(b)(1) provides:
(b) Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government:
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is reasonably available, a
judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority to issue a warrant to search for
and seize a person or property located within the district . . . .

695
696

Foschio, supra note 610, at ¶ II.4.
28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) provides:
(a) Each United States magistrate judge serving under this chapter shall have . . .
(1) all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or
by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts . . . .

697

See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 26–28.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
699 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Thousand, 558 Fed. App’x 666 (7th Cir. 2014); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a
Criminal Investigation, No. 15-XR-90304-HRL-1(LHK), 2015 WL 4594558 (N.D. Cal. July
29, 2015); United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Application of
U.S. for an Order for Authorization to Obtain Location Data Concerning an AT&T Cellular
Tel., 102 F. Supp. 3d 884 (N.D. Miss. 2015); In re Application for Cell Tower Records Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 90 F. Supp. 3d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2015); In re Application of U.S. for
an Order Authorizing Prospective and Continuous Release of Cell Site Location Records, 31
F. Supp. 3d 889 (S.D. Tex. 2014); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014
WL 2898262 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014); In re [Redacted]@gmail.com, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1100
(N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Info. for Tel. No. [Redacted], 40 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Search of
Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2014).
698
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3. Civil Consent Cases
The use of magistrate judges to preside in civil cases with the consent of
the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)700 expanded broadly from 1990 to 2014.
Civil consent authority was established in 1979 by amendments to the Federal
Magistrates Act.701 By 1990, magistrate judges were handling civil consent
cases in the majority of district courts, but in about a quarter of courts, magistrate judges had none or very few civil consent cases.702
By 2014, the number of courts reporting no civil consent cases had decreased to four, and the number reporting five or less had decreased to five.703
Therefore, the percentage of courts in which magistrate judges were utilized for
more than a minimum of civil consent cases expanded from about 75 percent of
courts to about 90 percent.704 The size of the expansion of civil consent authority is amply illustrated by the court with the largest number of civil consent cases disposed of in 2014, which was the Northern District of California with
1,623 civil consent cases.705
Several factors have contributed to the expansion of civil consent cases.
Perhaps the most significant was the statutory amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act that allowed district judges and magistrate judges, after litigants are
given initial notification of the consent option at the time of filing, to “again
advise the parties of the availability of the magistrate” judge to exercise consent
jurisdiction.706 After this statutory change in 1990, individual district judges
and courts began using various methods for facilitating consent in civil cases,
including reminding parties of the consent option at scheduling conferences and
educating the bar on civil consent authority in speeches at bar association functions. One of the court-wide methods, which has proved effective in a number
of courts, has been the inclusion of magistrate judges on the civil case assignment wheel for direct assignment of civil cases to the magistrate judge as the
presiding judge, subject to affirmative consent of the parties at a later date.707

700

The statute authorizes full-time magistrate judges “upon consent of the parties . . . to
conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012).
701 See The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643, 643–45
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012)).
702 In 1990, there were eight courts that reported no civil consent cases and fourteen courts
that reported five or fewer civil consent cases. The seventy other courts reported civil consent cases in widely varying numbers throughout the circuits. The highest number reported
was 487 in the District of Oregon. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 57, at
285–86 tbl.M-5.
703 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-5.
704 See supra notes 702–03.
705 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-5.
706 Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 308(a),
104 Stat. 5112 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)); see also supra Section I.B.1.b.ii.
707 See, e.g., Woodward & Penick, supra note 610.
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Approximately one-third of district courts have implemented a “direct assignment” system in one form or another.708
An additional causal factor has been the efforts of courts to encourage consents in social security and prisoner cases, which comprise a sizeable portion of
civil consent cases. While it is still a common practice for magistrate judges to
handle social security appeals on a report and recommendation basis, dispositions on consent of the parties actually outnumbered reports and recommendations in these cases in 2014.709
Parties consent to magistrate judges in various types of cases, from diversity cases such as motor vehicle accidents to more complex commercial litigation, including intellectual property cases. In the vast majority of civil cases in
district courts, of course, district judges are the presiding judges, but magistrate
judges preside on consent of the parties in a portion of civil cases. Civil consent
cases were 6 percent of the total number of terminations of civil cases in district
courts in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2013.710
E. Questions Relating to Effective Utilization of Magistrate Judges
The advice of the Magistrate Judges Committee to district courts on best
practices for the effective and efficient utilization of magistrate judges is proffered in a document originally adopted by the Committee in 1999, entitled Suggestions for Utilization of Magistrate Judges (Suggestions).711
Two practices that are beneficial to courts but that also raise practical questions about the most effective use of magistrate judges are examined below: (1)
the practice of referring case-dispositive motions to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations, and (2) the practice in many courts of using magistrate judges as “specialists” in certain types of cases and proceedings.
There is no single model within the judiciary for the utilization of magistrate judges, but the Judicial Conference resolved many years ago to encourage
“the full and effective utilization” of magistrate judges by the district courts.712
The dynamic relationship between the general goal of full and effective utilization and flexibility is adumbrated in the Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts, which was adopted by the Judicial Conference in 1995:

708

Statistics in possession of authors.
Reports and recommendations in social security appeals increased 39 percent from 2010
to 2014 (from 4,229 to 5,881), see JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, but
the number of social security appeals disposed of on consent rose 53 percent during that period (from 4,324 to 6,630) (statistics in possession of authors).
710 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.6.6.
711 See Comm. on the Admin. of the Magistrate Judges Sys., Judicial Conference of the
U.S., Suggestions for Utilization of Magistrate Judges (rev. ed. 2013) (unpublished document) (on file with authors); see also MCCABE, supra note 609, at 24–25.
712 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Sept. 1982).
709
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Magistrate judges should perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally
permissible and consistent with sound judicial policy. Individual districts should
retain flexibility, consistent with the national goal of effective utilization of all
magistrate judge resources, to have magistrate judges perform judicial services
most needed in light of local conditions and changing caseloads.713

1. Reports and Recommendations
The referral of case-dispositive motions by district judges to magistrate
judges for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition (i.e.,
reports and recommendations) is a statutorily authorized procedure.714 In effect,
it allows district judges to refer such motions that magistrate judges are not authorized by statute to adjudicate with finality absent consent of the parties. After the magistrate judge’s submission of a report and recommendation, the parties have fourteen days to file objections for “a de novo determination” by the
district judge.715 From the perspective of considering the most efficient means
of disposing of a motion, the report and recommendation procedure inserts extra procedural steps (and an additional judge) into the process of deciding a motion. To that extent, it tends to make the report and recommendation process a
less efficient means of ruling on a motion than if the motion were decided by
one judge with authority to make a final determination.
The Magistrate Judges Committee advises in its Suggestions that referrals
of case-dispositive motions for reports and recommendations may involve inefficient duplication of judicial work and therefore should be limited.716 The
Committee acknowledges that real benefits accrue to the court from the reports
and recommendations process, such as saving district judges’ time to permit
them to attend to other Article III duties, but concludes that the most efficient
references are those that do not involve de novo review by a district judge.717
However, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters for reports and
recommendations continued much the same in certain types of cases and increased in others during the expansion of utilization after 1990. From 1990 to
2014, the largest segment of reports and recommendations was in prisoner cases (state habeas corpus, federal habeas corpus and prisoner civil rights cases).718 The number of reports and recommendations in prisoner cases grew by a

713

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., supra note 649.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012).
715 Id. Section 636(b)(1) provides that “[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a
copy” of the report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written objections
. . . as provided by rules of court.” The district judge “shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made,” and “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the [report and recommendation].” Id.
716 See supra note 711.
717 See supra note 711.
718 See supra note 632.
714
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relatively small margin from 1990 to 2014 (from 20,583 to 26,140).719 The second largest segment is general civil cases (i.e., all civil cases other than prisoner
cases and social security appeals), but the number of reports and recommendations in these cases more than doubled in the past twenty-five years (from 7,388
to 19,081).720 The third largest segment of reports and recommendations is in
social security appeals. They rose slightly from 1990 to 2014 (from 5,112 to
5,881).721 Finally, the numbers of reports and recommendations in felony cases
varied annually from 1990 to 2014, but declined overall (from 4,169 to
3,200).722
As the statistics indicate, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters
for reports and recommendations continues to be used in virtually all district
courts, with a few exceptions. Courts give valid reasons for local referrals for
reports and recommendations.723 Some courts view reports and recommendations as a “necessary evil” for practical and equitable division of the court’s judicial workload among the court’s judges, often in the context of a heavy overall caseload. Many district judges find referrals of certain case-dispositive
motions, especially if they are to require evidentiary hearings (e.g., motions to
suppress evidence in felony cases), as extremely valuable time-savers. A substantial number of magistrate judges and district judges note that referral of
case-dispositive motions provide magistrate judges with some of the most professionally satisfying judicial work that they have. Finally, courts report that,
typically, objections are not filed to reports and recommendations issued in particular types of cases, such as social security appeals, in which case the delay in
adjudication of the motion is shortened to some degree.
Interestingly, courts continue to refer motions to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations at the same time that the numbers of civil consent
cases have risen since 1990. This suggests that the courts’ continued referrals
for reports and recommendations do not imply a lack of confidence in the use
of magistrate judges to the fullest extent of their authority. However, in the authors’ opinion, it does suggest that the report and recommendation process will
continue to be used for some time to come.

719

Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
720 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
721 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
722 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.
723 Although it is not verifiable by citation to any publication available to the public, the
content is based on numerous interviews with judges about magistrate judge utilization practices in many district courts, and periodic written reports on individual courts’ practices
which are made by the authors and other attorneys in the normal course of their work at the
Administrative Office.
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2. The Specialist-Generalist Question
Carroll Seron, in her excellent 1985 study for the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC) on magistrate judge utilization, identified three models of utilization
from her empirical research on the district courts: (1) the “specialist,” (2) the
“team player,” and (3) the “additional judge.”724 The specialist role is of interest here. Using a magistrate judge as a specialist refers to the automatic referral
of cases to magistrate judges in certain special areas of the civil docket, most
commonly social security appeals and prisoner cases, for reports and recommendations or disposition on consent, to allow magistrate judges to build up a
special expertise in an area where there is an ongoing, large caseload. The specialist model is also implicated by the practice of referring all pretrial matters
of a certain type, such as discovery motions or settlement conferences, to capitalize on the expertise that magistrate judges have developed.725
As Carroll Seron’s study indicates, there is a long history of courts using
magistrate judges in specialist roles.726 Many courts today refer all or most
prisoner cases and social security appeals to magistrate judges for reports and
recommendations or disposition on consent.727 Moreover, in many courts, magistrate judges are heavily relied on to conduct settlement conferences in recognition of their mediation skills.728
However, with the establishment of the magistrate judges system, Congress
sought to avoid creating a lower-tiered federal judicial position with jurisdiction limited to certain types of litigation.729 The FCSC, likewise, recognized the
need to “safeguard against undermining the institutional supplementary role” of
magistrate judges, and against the “unintentional creation of a lower-tiered judicial office with separate and distinct responsibilities.”730 Legislation has been
proposed from outside the judiciary from time to time that would carve out certain matters for assignment to magistrate judges. The Judicial Conference has
disapproved in principle of legislation that mandates that a district court auto724

SERON, supra note 610, at 35–46, 59–92.
Id. at 35.
726 See id.
727 Magistrate judges issued 26,140 reports and recommendations in prisoner cases in the
twelve months ending September 30, 2014. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at
tbl.S-17.
728 Magistrate judges conducted 20,641 settlement conferences in the twelve months ending
September 30, 2014. Id.
729 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 11 (1979). As the House Committee on the Judiciary stated
in rejecting jurisdictional limitations on civil consent authority in the committee report on
H.R. 1046, the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979:
725

If a magistrate is competent to handle any case-dispositive jurisdiction, he should be fully competent to handle all case-dispositive jurisdiction. Such a rule preserves the generalist posture of
the magistrate, as well as insures that . . . there is [not] an impetus to appoint “specialized” magistrates to handle only narrow types of cases.

Id.
730

FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79.
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matically refer particular types of cases to magistrate judges.731 In addition, the
Magistrate Judges Committee advises that courts benefit from using the full array of its magistrate judges’ skills rather than assigning them only specified
types of cases that consume most of their time.732 The generalist nature of magistrate judge positions is, moreover, a recruitment asset, helping to attract topquality candidates with broad substantive knowledge and skills.
Therefore, the question is, how can the longstanding practice in many
courts of using magistrate judges as specialists be reconciled with the preferred
policy of not limiting magistrate judge jurisdiction to certain types of cases?
This “specialist-generalist question” usually arises with respect to courts that
have heavy prisoner or social security caseloads and that find it most effective
and efficient to use magistrate judges as specialists to adjudicate these cases.
On the other hand, some courts with low overall caseloads appear to emphasize
the use of magistrate judges as specialists for prisoner cases or social security
appeals in lieu of referrals and consents in general civil cases. In a number of
courts, the specialist-generalist roles appear to have been reconciled by using
magistrate judges in both roles, that is, as specialists for certain narrow types of
cases (e.g., state habeas corpus cases) but also as generalists in a range of other
types of cases. This continues to be a complicated issue with no easy solutions.
CONCLUSION
It seems certain that the use of magistrate judges in the federal judiciary
will continue to evolve and expand in the coming years. Just as district judges
have expanded the authority of magistrate judges and courts have explored innovative ways of utilizing magistrate judges in the past twenty-five years, it is
likely that these trends will carry over into the future. It is our hope that the
analysis of the expansion of magistrate judge authority and utilization described
in this paper has increased the readers’ overall awareness of these significant
federal judges and convinced them of their indispensable role in the federal judiciary.

731

See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Mar. 1980).
732 See supra note 711, 723.
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